A Matter of Difference: Domestic Contracts and Gender Equality by Cossman, Brenda
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 
Volume 28 
Issue 2 Volume 28, Number 2 (Summer 1990) Article 2 
4-1-1990 
A Matter of Difference: Domestic Contracts and Gender Equality 
Brenda Cossman 
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Family Law Commons, and the Law and Gender 
Commons 
Article 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative 
Works 4.0 License. 
Citation Information 
Cossman, Brenda. "A Matter of Difference: Domestic Contracts and Gender Equality." Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal 28.2 (1990) : 303-380. 
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol28/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons. 
A Matter of Difference: Domestic Contracts and Gender Equality 
Abstract 
This essay explores the feminist debates around gender difference and gender equality in the context of 
the Supreme Court of Canada's Pelech trilogy. It argues that the Court's approach to the enforcement of 
separation agreements does not adequately account for gender difference. Based on feminist critiques of 
difference, the essay then suggests an approach which might allow us to move beyond the dilemmas that 
difference presents to feminist legal theory and practice, and to the enforcement of separation 
agreements in particular. 
Keywords 
Separation (Law); Feminist jurisprudence 
Creative Commons License 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 
License. 
This article is available in Osgoode Hall Law Journal: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol28/iss2/2 




This essay explores the feminist debates around gender difference and gender
equality in the context of the Supreme Court of Canada's Pelech trilogy. It argues
that the Court's approach to the enforcement of separation agreements does not
adequately account for gender difference.' Based on feminist critiques of difference,
the essay then suggests an approach which might allow us to move beyond the
dilemmas that difference presents to feminist legal theory and practice, and to the
enforcement of separation agreements in particular.
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Domestic Contracts
Law, like every other cultural institution, is a place where we tell one another
stories about relationships with ourselves, one another, and authority.
Clare Dalton
L LNTRODUCION
In the recent Supreme Court of Canada trilogy of decisions
of Pelech v. Pelech,2 Richardson v. Richardson,3 and Caron v. Caron,4
the Court specifically addressed the question of the appropriate
exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction of separation agreements.
While all three cases involved an application under section 11(2) of
the Divorce Act, 19705 to have a separation agreement varied, the
significance of the trilogy extends well beyond the interpretation of
the specific statutory provision. On one level, these decisions
represent a general approach to the enforcement of domestic
contracts based on a particular conception of support. This
conception may inform similar applications under the new Divorce
Act, 1985 and provincial statutes such as the Family Law Act.
6
These decisions deal not only with the reach of the Court's
supervisory jurisdiction over separation agreements, but, at a deeper
level, they tell a story, as law always tells stories, about our
relationships with ourselves, one another, and authority. The story
that these decisions tell us about the enforcement of domestic
contracts is a story about the nature of individuals, the family, and
C. Dalton, "An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine" (1985) 94 Yale L.
Rev. 997 at 999.
2 (1987), 7 R.F.L. (3d) 225.
3 (1987), 7 R.F.L (3d) 304.
4 (197), 7 R.F.L. (3d) 274.
5 R.S.C. 1970, c. D-8.
6 S.O. 1986, c. 4. For a discussion about the extent to which the Pelch trilogy has been
applied to provincial statutes and to the Divorce Act, 1985, see K. Higginson, "Causal
'Connection: The Development of a Threshold Test for Entitlement to Spousal Support"
(1989) 4 C.F.L.Q. 107; LH. Wolfson, Mh Legacy of Pelach v. Pelech" (1989) 4 C.F.L.Q. 115.
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society, and about the relationships between them. It is a story
about the relationships between self and other, private and public.
At the same time, this is a story about the nature of, and the
relationship between, men and women in our society, about gender,
gender difference, and gender equality.
Stories that we tell about gender are not just stories about
gender; rather, they also implicate race and class. Unfortunately, we
tend to forget about these other stories because we treat race and
class as constants in our stories, that is, we simply assume white and
middle class. So it is the case with the story of gender, gender
difference, and gender equality being told in these cases. It is more
appropriate to describe the story as one about some women and
some men in our society.
It is these stories underlying the trilogy that I hope to
explicate and examine. In its approach to the enforcement of
domestic contracts, the Court's decision rests on an understanding
of the individual, of the family, and of gender equality. While the
Court did not articulate its story in terms of gender equality, an
approach to gender relations is implicit in the judgments. The
Court's approach to gender relations is so dominant and widespread
that it is taken for granted. In making it explicit, this essay
examines the dilemma produced, and offers an alternative story that
moves beyond that dilemma.
II. THE PELECH DECISION
In Pelech,7 an application was brought under section 11(2) of
the Divorce Act, 1970, to vary an award of maintenance made
thirteen years earlier. The applicant had suffered severe physical
and psychological problems, and her economic circumstances had
significantly deteriorated as a result.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the original order
of maintenance ought not to be varied. Justice Wilson, writing for
the majority, identified two approaches to the enforcement of
7 Ibis essay will foas primarily on the Pelech decision as it is the case in which the
Court articulated the principles of the law governing its supervisory jurisdiction of separation
agreements.
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separation agreements. The private choice approach, exemplified
by the decision of Zuber J.A. in Farquar v. Farquar,8 emphasizes
the importance of freedom of contract, and the value of allowing
the parties to determine their relationship upon a marital
breakdown. According to this approach, the Court should only
intervene to invalidate a separation agreement when traditional
common law or equitable doctrines permit, or should overturn an
otherwise valid agreement in a narrow range of cases.
The second approach, which Wilson J. referred to as
paternalistic, is exemplified by the decisions of the Manitoba Court
of Appeal in Newman v. Newman,9 Katz v. Katz,1 and Ross v.
Ross.1 1 In Pelech, Wilson I. emphasizes the need for agreements to
conform to judicial standards of reasonableness and fairness. A
Court taking this approach will be far more willing to intervene in
the contractual arrangements of the parties and to examine whether
the arrangements meet these judicial standards. The concern with
fairness focuses attention on the need, or potential need, to
compensate for gender-based inequalities. Wilson J. then identified
a compromise approach which concentrates on the magnitude of the
change to the parties' lives. She associated this approach with the
decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Webb v. Webb
2
Wilson J.'s conclusion most closely approximates this
compromise position. She rejected Matas J.A.'s paternalistic
approach by affirming the finality of separation agreements and the
need for judicial deference to individuals who make their own
private choice decisions.1 3 However, she diverged from the private
choice approach as articulated by Zuber J.A. She concluded that
his decision fell "short of articulating a workable criterion by failing
8 (1983), 1 D.LR. (4th) 244 (OnLCA.).
9 (1980), 114 D.LR. (3d) 517.
10 (1983), 33 R.F.L (2d) 412.
11 (1984), 6 D.LR (4th) 385.
12 (1984), 10 D.LR. (4th) 74.
1 3 Pelech, supra, note 2 at 268.
1990]
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to identify the requisites of the 'narrow range of cases'."14 Wilson
J. similarly rejected the test in Webb as inadequate because its sole
criterion was the magnitude of the change; it takes no account of
whether the change was in some way "related to the fact of the
marriage."
15
Wilson J. concluded that the Court should only exercise its
jurisdiction to override the provisions of a separation agreement
"where an applicant seeking maintenance or an increase in the
existing level of maintenance establishes that he or she has suffered
a radical change in circumstances flowing from an economic pattern
of dependency engendered by the marriage."16 Wilson J. decided on
the facts of the case that despite Mrs. Pelech's substantial change in
circumstances, her current hardship was not causally related to the
marriage and the separation agreement ought thus to remain intact.
On its face, the Pelech decision may not seem to involve a
question of gender equality. Rather, it seems to question the
judicial supervisory power over separation agreements. The decision
tells us that there are at least two approaches to this supervisory
question, one that recognizes a gender equality question in the
enforcement of separation agreements, and one that does not. The
compromise position adopted by the Court specifically denies that
compensation for systemic gender inequality is a ground for
exercising the supervisory power. The decision suggests that the
enforcement of separation agreements is not a question of gender
equality.
The Court treats only one of these approaches as an issue of
gender equality. Yet, this is just the Court's story and I will argue
that both approaches involve stories of gender equality, although
they differ as to its meaning. The two approaches correspond to
the two competing models of gender equality, that is, the sameness
or equal-treatment model and the difference or special-treatment
14 Ibid at 269.
15 bid. at 269. Further, "In order to impose responsibility for changed circumstances
on a former spouse it seems to me essential that there must be some relationship between the
change and the marriage." bi& at 269-70.
16 Ibid at 270.
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model. In Pelech, a normative choice between these competing
models was required. The compromise position adopted by the
Court is an attempt to bridge the gap between the approaches of
sameness and difference and to overcome the dilemma of difference.
III. GENDER EQUALITY AND THE DILEMMA OF
DIFFERENCE
The prevailing conception of equality as "treating likes
alike,"17 and its constitutional expression in equal protection doctrine
as the requirement that "those [who are] similarly situated be
similarly treated,"48  have made sameness the fundamental
prerequisite of equality. If you are not the same, that is, if you are
different, then you are not entitled to equality 9  From this
perspective the only question that matters is: are you the same?
This underlying connection between equality and sameness
has led to a focus in the theory and practice of gender equality on
the questions of gender difference and its significance.20  Two
17 This conceptioni of equality has dominated Western thought since Aristotle's
Nicomachean Ethics.
18 1. Tussman & J. tenBroek, "The Equal Protection of the Laws" (1948) 37 Calif. L.
Rev. 341 at 345. This standard of "similarly situated," which has long been the standard in
American equal protection doctrine, has recently been explicitly rejected by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia (1989), 56 D.LR. (4th) 1.
19 Ibis connection between sameness and equality, and between difference and inequality,
is developed by M. Minow in "Learning to Live with the Dilemma of Difference: Bilingual
and Special Education" (Spring 1985) 48:2 Law & Contem. Prob. 157 at 202-06 [hereinafter
"Dilemma of Difference"].
20 For a more in-depth review of the equal treatment/special treatment debate, see W.W.
Williams, "The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism" (1982)
7 Women's Rights L Rep. 175; W.W. Williams, "Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate" (1985) 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 325; S.A.
Law, "Rethinking Sex and the Constitution" (1984) 132 U. Pa. L Rev. 955; CA. Littleton,
'Towards a Redefinition of Sexual Equality" (1981) 94 Harv. L Rev. 487; A.R. Miles,
"Feminism, Equality, and Liberation" (1985) 1 CJ.W.L. 42; E.H. Wolgast, Equality and the
Rights of Women (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1980); CA MacKinnon, SexualHarassment
of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1979); CA
MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1987) [hereinafter Feminism Unmodified]; L Finley, 'Transcending Equality
3091990]
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competing models of gender equality have emerged which are
divided precisely on the question of the significance to be attached
to the gender difference.
One model is premised on the essential sameness of the
sexes, and the requirement of equal treatment or formal equality.2'
This model accepts the assumed connection between sameness and
equality. It attempts to fit women within this prevailing conception
by insisting that they are the same as men, and therefore have the
right to equal treatment. The model claims women should be let
into the world of men, from which they have traditionally been
excluded, because of their difference.
Proponents of this approach to gender equality argue that
special treatment has historically been used as a double-edged sword.
Under the guise of protection, special treatment has been used to
discriminate against women and has kept them out of the public
world of men. It is argued that any admission of gender difference,
and any corresponding attempt to provide for such difference, will
simply provide a justification for continued unequal and
discriminatory treatment. Simply stated, any recognition of
difference will perpetuate the difference, and with it the inequality.
The second model of gender equality is premised on a
recognition of gender difference.22 Without necessarily agreeing
about What these differences are, nor about whether they are natural
or socially constructed or both, proponents of this model insist that
in the life experiences of women these differences are real.
Ignoring these real differences will eradicate neither the differences
nor the underlying inequalities. The ostensibly gender neutral
standards of the equal treatment model are argued to be male
Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate" (1986) 86 Colum. L. Rev.
1118.
21 This equal treatment approach is most often associated with the work of Williams,
supra, note 20.
22 See, for example, Wolgast, supra, note 20, and AC. Scales, "Towards a Feminist
Jurisprudence" (1981) 56 Ind. L. J. 375.
[VoL 28 No. 2
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standards; that is, standards established from a male perspective.23
Application of these gender biased standards will punish women for
their difference and reinforce the underlying inequalities. In judging
women by male norms, the equal treatment model is seen to deliver
the limited promise held out by the conception of equality as
sameness - women are only treated equally to the extent that they
are like men. When women are not the same as men, when they
are different, they are denied equality. The difference model
concludes that substantive equality between the sexes therefore
demands the recognition of difference.
24
23 N. Taub, Book Review (1980) 80 Colum. L Rev. 1686 at 1694, writes: "Rules
formulated in a male-dominated society reflect male needs, male concerns and male
experience." Christine Littleton has similarly argued, in 'Toward a Redefinition of Sexual
Equality," supra, note 20 at 487, that the dominant conception of sexual equality as equal
treatment demands assimilation to these male norms: "In this conception, women are told that
they can only hope to gain a share of social rewards equal to men's by adopting traditional
male roles. Women are thus convinced to demand no more, and often substantially less, than
the chance to assimilate themselves into existing educational, labour, and other social
institutions - rather than to demand that the institutions change to meet women's needs as
they see them." From this perspective the standard of sameness - that is, the answer to the
question "the same as who?" - is thus "men."
24 Proponents of this approach have difficulty reconciling its recognition of difference
with the prevailing conception of equality as sameness. Wolgast, supra, note 20 at 50
concedes the point in arguing that equality cannot accommodate differences; equal rights "are
rights with respect to which Justice should be blind, for their possession does not depend
upon a person's having any qualification.m" Such rights, according to Wolgast, supra, note 20
at 49, are appropriate when sex differences are irrelevant, and when the sexes are similarly
situated; special rights, on the other hand, are rights in which "qualifications are relevant and
important," and are appropriate when sex differences are relevant.
Other proponents of this special treatment of the difference model do not so readily
concede the incompatibility of equality and difference. Many argue that the very notion of
equality must be restricted or reformulated to accommodate difference. See Littleton, supra,
note 20. Notwithstanding her belief in the possibility of synthesis, Miles, supra, note 20 at 52
notes that the themes of equality and difference "continue to coexist ... in awkward
contradiction." See also, MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, supra, note 20 at 33.
The Andrews case, supra, note 18, in rejecting the similarly situated test for
discrimination under section 15, may be seen to represent a rejection of the simple equation
of equality and sameness, and to provide at least the basis for a reconciliation of equality and
difference. While the decision confirmed the rejection of a more formal equality approach, and
opened space for a substantive approach to equality in which gender differences could be
recognized, it has not entirely resolved the sameness/difference dilemma in the context of
gender equality. The decision has not, however, eradicated the need to make choices regarding
when difference ought tb be recognized in the name of substantive equality. It states only that
the difference can be recognized.
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These two models of gender equality thus represent two
different approaches to the question of gender difference. The
sameness model denies the relevance of difference, but fails to
deliver any substantive equality in a world which does not deny the
relevance. On the other hand, the difference model recognizes the
relevance of difference but encounters problems in translating
difference into equality discourse and risks recreating the difference.
The prevailing understandings of gender equality have thus run into
what Martha Minow has described as the "dilemma of difference.0
25
The dilemma of difference involves the risk of both recreating and
devaluing difference by recognizing or ignoring it.
Identification or acknowledgement of a trait of difference, associated by the
dominant group with minority identity, risks recreating occasions for majority
discrimination based on that trait. Non identification or non acknowledgement,
however, risks recreating occasions for discrimination based on majority practices
such as tests, norms, and judgments forged without regard for difference, or with
regard solely for the perspective, needs, and interests of the dominant group.
Because minority differences have been made to carry implications for a person's
worth and status a minority member may be reluctant to expose or emphasize such
difference. Yet nonexposure can subject the minority to evaluation by allegedly
neutral criteria that in fact implement the majority values and view.
2 6
The sameness approach and the difference approach
represent the two sides of this dilemma. In ignoring gender
difference, the sameness approach both devalues it and risks
recreating the underlying inequality by judging women according to
the norms, perspectives, and standards of a male-defined world. For
example, ignoring pregnancy as a difference both devalues the
experience of pregnancy for women and risks recreating the
conditions of social inequality that have flowed from pregnancy as a
socially relevant difference.
25 Minow, "Dilemma of Difference," supra, note 19. Also see Minow, "When Difference
Has Its Home: Group Homes for the Mentally Retarded, Equal Protection and Legal
Treatment of Difference" (1987) 22 Harv. Civ. Rts. - Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 111 [hereinafter "When
Difference Has Its Home"] and M. Minow, "The Supreme Court 1986 Term - Foreword:
Justice Engendered" (1987) 101 Harv. L. Rev. 10 [hereinafter "Foreword"]. Minow identifies
three versions of the dilemma of difference: (1) the risk of recreating difference by either
noticing or ignoring it, (2) the riddle of neutrality, and (3) the choice between discretion and
formal rules. The second and third dilemma are discussed infra at 334-37 and 364-65.
26 M. Minow, "Dilemma of Difference," supra, note 19 at 160.
312 [VOL. 28 No. 2
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Similarly, the difference approach risks reinstating the
differences it recognizes, and the underlying structures of inequality
which have produced them. Thus, to recognize pregnancy as a
socially relevant difference is to risk reinstaiting the social
construction of woman as mother and recreating the opportunity to
discriminate against women in the distribution of benefits and
burdens in society. Furthermore, the recognition of pregnancy as a
relevant difference does not necessarily affirm the value of
difference. Rather, in the context of a male standard of value and
the association of difference and inequality, the difference label may
reinforce the undervaluation of pregnancy.?'
In the context of family law, the dilemma of difference can
be seen in the debate regarding the approach to property division
and support upon marital breakdown. The debate has focused on
the question of how women's economic dependency, resulting from
the traditional division of labour within the family, can be overcome.
One favours an approach of formal equality based on the equal
application of gender-neutral rules to women and men. Reflecting
the general structure of the sameness approach, any recognition of
economic dependency is said to simply recreate that dependency.
28
The opposing argument is that substantive equality demands a
recognition of women's economic dependence. By failing to
recognize the economic dependency of women on men, it is argued
that the formal equality approach will recreate the very difference
27 The dilemma of difference is not limited to the classic example of pregnancy but
rather, has plagued virtually all areas of gender equality, from the question of women in the
military to questions of pay equity and comparable worth. Nor is the dilemma limited to the
issue of gender equality. The dilemma plagues all areas of equality where difference is an
issue, from race and religion to physical and mental handicap. The fundamental question in
all of these areas is whether to apply principles of formal equality, and thus ignore difference,
or whether the principle of substantive equality requires the recognition of difference. See
M. Minow, "Foreword," supra, note 25 and F. Michelman, "The Meanings of Legal Equality"
(1986) 3 Harvard Blackletter J. 24.
28 R. Deech, "The Principles of Maintenance" (1977) 7 Fain. L Rev. 229 at 230: "...
[L]egal supposition of female dependency tends to deny freedom of choice to married and
formerly married persons; it is widely considered degrading to women and it perpetuates the
common law proprietary relationship of husband and wife even after divorce."
1990]
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it has set out to transcend.29 This debate has been played out in
the recent process of family law reform. While the formal equality
approach won the day,30 the reform has been severely criticized as
having realized the fears of the difference approach, that is, of
having exacerbated the harsh economic reality women face upon
marital breakdown.
31
29 See K. O'Donovan, "The Principles of Maintenance: An Alternative View" (1978) 8
Fain. L. Rev. 180 at 181 [hereinafter "An Alternative View"]:
... [The current organization of family life is premised on the assumption that one
partner will sacrifice a cash income in order to rear children and manage the home.
The dependence of the non-earning spouse on the wage-earner is inevitable under
present family arrangements. This leads in turn to inequality of earning power of
spouses. Without a major change in social and family structures the Deech or Gray
proposals serve merely to perpetuate an already unfair solution and will not secure
equality.
See MJ. Mossman, "Family Law and Social Welfare in Canada" in 1. Bernier &
A. Lajoie eds, Family Law and Social Welfare Legislation in Canada (Toronto: Universily of
Toronto Press, 1986) at 43 [hereinafter "Family Law and Social Welfare"]; MJ. Mossman &
M. MacLean, "Family Law and Social Welfare: Toward a New Equality" (1986) 5 Can J. of
Fain. L. 79 [hereinafter "Toward a New Equality"]; C. Smart, "Marriage, Divorce, and
Women's Economic Dependency: A Discussion of the Politics of Private Maintenance" in
M.D.A. Freeman, ed., State, Law, and the Family: Critical Perspectives (New York: Tavistock,
1984) at 9; M. Fineman, "Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change
- A Study of Rhetoric and Results in the Regulation of the Consequences of Divorce" [1983]
Wise. L Rev. 789 [hereinafter "Implementing Equality'); F.E. Olsen, 'The Family and the
Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform" (1983) 96 Harv. L Rev. 1497 [hereinafter
"The Family and the Market"].
30 MJ. Mossman, "Family Law and Social Welfare," supra, note 29, 43 at 44-51; and J.D.
Payne "Family Law in Canada and The Financial Consequences of Marriage Breakdown and
Divorce" [hereinafter "The Financial Consequences"] in I. Bernier & A. LaJoic eds, Family
Law and Social Welfare, supra, note 29 at 1; N. Duclos, "Breaking the Dependency Circle:
The Family Law Act Reconsidered" (1987) 45 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 1. In G. Cook, "Economic
Issues in Marriage Breakdown" in R.S. Abella & C. L'Heureux-Dubd eds, Family Law:
Dimensions of Justice (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) at 23 the philosophy of individual
economic self sufficiency underlying the FamilyLaw Reform Act is discussed. See L. Weitzman,
The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and Economic Consequences for Women and
Children in America (New York: The Free Press, 1985) [hereinafter The Divorce Revolution];
M. Glendon, The New Family and the New Property (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981); M.
Fineman, "Implementing Equality," supra, note 29; F.E. Olsen, "The Family and the Market,"
supra, note 29.
31 MJ. Mossman & M. MacLean, 'Toward a New Equality," supra, note 29 at 93:
The recent fimily law reform legislation establishes a principle of equality of spousal
entitlement to the division of matrimonial property and then declares each spouse
independent and autonomous for purposes of legal rights and obligations, especially
regarding ongoing financial support. Such an approach, however, essentially fails
[VOL 28 NO. 2
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IV. THE DILEMMA OF DIFFERENCE IN PELECH
The two competing approaches to the enforcement of
separation agreements outlined by Wilson J. in Pelech32 correspond
to these two sides of the dilemma of difference. The private choice
approach is based on the sameness model and the paternalistic
approach is based on the difference model. Moreover, the
compromise adopted by the Court is based on both sides of the
dilemma, that is, the rule is based on the sameness model whereas
the exception is based on the difference model.
A. The Private Choice Approach
In outlining the private choice approach, Wilson J. reviewed
Zuber J.A.'s reasons in Farquar3 3 holding that it is preferable for
parties to settle their own affairs upon marital breakdown. Zuber
J.A.'s reasons included that:
(1) the parties are more likely to accept and live with an arrangement they have
made themselves as opposed to one imposed upon them; (2) the administrative
burden of the courts is relieved by respecting parties' freedom of contract; and (3)
to achieve effective equality because male and female spouses are not similarly
situated upon divorce or marriage breakdown, particularly in relation to access to
financial security.
See MJ. Mossman, "Family Law and Social Welfare," supra, note 29; G. Cook, supra note 30;
M. Fineman, "Implementing Equality," supra, note 30 regarding effects on women of family
law reform embracing formal equality; L. Weitzman, "The Economics of Divorce: Social and
Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards" (1981) 28 U.C.L.A.
L Rev. 1181; L Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution, supra, note 30 which documents the harsh
effects on women of no-fault divorce laws in California that are predicated on formal equality;
K. O'Donovan, "An Alternative View," supra, note 29 and C. Smart, The 7es that Bind: Law,
Marriage and the Reproduction, of Patriarchal Relations (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1984) for a discussion of British family law reform adopting formal equality and reinforcing
women's economic dependence. See also M.A. Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987) regarding how post divorce economic burdens
fall disproportionately on women.
32 Supra, note 2.
33 Supra, note 8.
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treating the agreement reached by the parties as final allows them to plan their
separate futures with relative peace of mind.
3 4
As Wilson J. explained, "the core values underlying" the
private choice approach to the enforcement of separation
agreements "are those of individual responsibility and freedom of
contract.'35 At first glance, these values may not appear to be
related to the question of gender equality, but on further reflection,
an intimate, albeit silent, connection is evident.
In the private choice approach to the enforcement of
separation agreements, nowhere is gender equality explicitly
mentioned. No differences between women and men are
recognized. No mention is made of women's economic dependence
on men. Rather, the focus of the approach is on the importance of
the values of individual responsibility and freedom of contract, values
which are equally applied to women and men. The assumption
underlying this approach is that, for the purposes of the enforcement
of separation agreements, women are the same as men. They are
presumed to be the same in entering into such agreements and in
the situations giving rise to enforcement disputes. Therefore, in
accordance with the sameness approach, women must be treated the
same as men, and the same gender neutral universal principles of
individual responsibility and freedom of choice must be applied,
irrespective of gender.
It is the very adoption of the sameness approach to gender
equality in this context that can be seen to silence the question of
gender equality. When dealing specifically with a constitutional or
34 Pelech, supra, note 2 at 257; Wilson J. also cited with approval Anderson J. in Dal
Santo v. Dal Santo (1975), 21 R.F.L 117 at 120:
It is of great importance not only to the parties but to the community as a whole
that contracts of this kind should not be lightly disturbed. Lawyers must be able
to advise their clients in respect of their future rights and obligations with some
degree of certainty. Clients must be able to rely on these agreements and know
with some degree of assurance that once a separation agreement is executed their
affairs have been settled on a permanent basis. The courts must encourage parties
to settle their differences without recourse to litigation. The modern approach in
family law is to mediate and conciliate so as to enable the parties to make a fresh
start in life on a secure basis. If separation agreements can be varied at will, it will
become much more difficult to persuade the parties to enter into such agreements.
3 5 Pelech, supra, note 2 at 258.
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discrimination issue, the sameness approach must speak the discourse
of equality. However, when dealing with private family law, where
the doctrines of constitutional or discrimination law are not
immediately implicated, the premise of the sameness approach,
superimposed on the deeply gendered roles and role enforcement of
family law and practice, seems to preclude or at least divert any
question of gender equality. The premise of this approach is that
gender ought not to make any difference and that gender neutral
principles ought to be universally applied. Since gender is not
constructed as a relevant difference, there is simply no reason for
this sameness approach to broach the question of difference.
According to its own internal logic, its very approach to gender
equality thus silences the question of gender equality.
B. The Paternalistic Approach
Though described by Wilson J. primarily in terms of its
concern with the standards of fairness and reasonableness in
enforcing separation agreements, this approach recognizes the
question of gender equality as tied to the more general questions of
fairness and reasonableness. This recognition of gender equality as
an issue is perhaps most explicit in Ross v. Ross,36 a decision of the
Manitoba Court of Appeal, wherein Matas J.A. held:
In my opinion, we have not yet reached the stage where we can safely say that
generally husbands and wives are equal or nearly so, in earning capacity, or where
we can necessarily say that generally the responsibilities of marriage have not
disadvantaged the earning potential of the wife. In many cases, especially of more
recent marriages, the Courts could rely on the fairness of imposing an obligation
on the wife to quickly become self-supporting. In some cases, the court could
not.37
Matas J.A.'s approach to the enforcement of separation
agreements is premised on a recognition of the existing inequalities
between women and men and, thus, of difference. He expressly
acknowledges the economic inequality women continue to face in
36 (1984), 6 D.1-R. (4th) 385.
3 7 ]bid at 396.
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society and the relationship between that inequality and women's
traditional position in the marital relationship. Underlying this
approach is the understanding that women are not traditionally the
same as men. Rather, women are economically unequal to men in
society and economically dependent on men in marriage.
Matas J.A. sets out two contrasting hypothetical marital
relationships through which he argues that treating persons who are
not the same as though they were would produce unfair results. It
would be unfair to treat women who are not economically self-
sufficient as if they are economically equal to men who are
economically self-sufficient.
Take two extreme hypothetical examples: In the first, a wife entered marriage 30
years ago, before the development of current concepts in respect of a wife becoming
self-supporting. She did not have the opportunity to become suitably trained for
the job market.... Her husband, in the meantime, has advanced his career and has
become a successful and possibly wealthy professional or businessman. After 30
years, the parties divorce.
In the second example, a young woman enters marriage having been well
trained for the job.... The parties have children but the wife and her husband share
equally in the responsibilities of caring for them, and looking after the home. They
each advance in their respective careers in a way that does not place the wife at a
permanent disadvantage in the labour market....
It would be patently unfair to try to force both these kinds of marriages
into specific categories in order to decide the appropriate level of maintenance to
be paid, or to decide if the court should intervene to correct an unjust agreement.
3 8
In accordance with the difference model, Matas J.A.'s approach can
be seen to recognize that ignoring these differences will punish
women for their differences. Rather than overcoming or reducing
the economic inequality, ignoring these differences will simply
reaffirm them. In effect, women's economic dependence on men in
marriage will be used to reinforce or perpetuate their economic
inequality in society.
The dilemma of difference emerges regardless of which two
of the competing models is initially adopted in judging the
enforcement of separation agreements. The private choice
approach, in ignoring women's economic dependence on men in
marriage, recreates women's economic inequality in society, while at
the same time devaluing women's traditional role in, and
38 bid. at 396.
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contribution to, the family. The paternalistic approach, by focusing
on women's economic dependence on men, recreates the
construction of women's identity as economically dependent on men.
It reinforces the portrayal of women as different from the male
norm - a difference which has a negative connotation.
C. The Pelech Compromise
The compromise position in Pelech can be seen to be
constituted of a rule and an exception to the rule. Wilson J. rejects
the paternalistic approach as the general policy for the enforcement
of separation agreements. She explicitly rejects its recognition of
the "need to compensate for systemic gender-based inequality" on
the ground that such recognition will reinforce this gender-based
inequality:
While I am in sympathy with Matas JA's concern, I believe that the case by case
approach and the continuing surveillance by the courts over the consensual
arrangements of former spouses which he advocates will ultimately reinforce the
very bias he seeks to counteract. 9
Her analysis can be seen to embrace one side of the difference
dilemma, that is, focusing on differences risks recreating the
differences.
Wilson J. adopts the private ordering approach and its
underlying rationale as the general policy for the enforcement of
separation agreements:
... I believe that every encouragement should be given to ex-spouses to settle their
financial affairs in a final way so that they can put their mistakes behind them and
get on with their lives.40
In so doing, she embraces the sameness model of gender equality
implicit in this approach. The spouses are assumed to be situated
similarly in relation to their past shared mistakes. There is,
accordingly, no recognition of gender difference. Rather, it is
assumed, as a general rule, that both parties are equally capable of
3 9 Pelech, supra note 2 at 268.
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getting on with their lives. Furthermore, the role of law apparent
in Wilson J.'s private ordering approach corresponds to the role of
law embodied in the sameness approach. She repeatedly emphasizes
that "people should be encouraged to take responsibility for their
own lives and their own decisions."4 1 It is the role of law to provide
such encouragement.
Wilson J. creates an exception to this private ordering rule,
according to which the court may exercise its discretionary power to
intervene in the private agreement of the parties where there has
been "a radical change in circumstances flowing from an economic
pattern of dependency engendered by the marriage."42 Where a
causal connection can be shown between the changed circumstances
and the marital relationship, Wilson J. is prepared to recognize
women's economic dependency on men within the marital
relationship. This exception to the general rule is based on the
recognition of difference, which underlies the paternalistic approach.
According to this exception, the difference is recognized if it has
produced the change in circumstances and the economic
dependence. Within the narrow confines of this exception, Wilson
J. implicitly responded to the other side of the dilemma of
difference, acknowledging that to ignore difference is to risk
recreating it. There is an underlying understanding that to ignore
the woman's economic dependence, which has produced her radically
worsened economic situation, will do no more than reaffirm the
economic inequality.
However, despite this exception to the general rule, the
decision obscures the question of gender equality. The exception is
individual in nature and it is overshadowed by the explicit rejection
of gender equality as an appropriate criterion for the exercise of
judicial discretion. The exception to the rule may enlarge judicial
discretion, but it does so without developing any norms, or
acknowledging the role, of equality.
Notwithstanding its failure to unearth and address directly
the societal issues of gender inequality, Wilson J.'s approach to the
41 kbid. at 269.
42 Ibid. at 270.
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enforcement of separation agreements attempts to bridge the gap
between the two competing approaches, and, in turn, between the
competing models of gender equality. While adopting, as the
general rule, the private ordering approach, and the underlying
sameness model of gender equality, the decision also provides an
exception based on the paternalistic approach, and the underlying
difference model of gender equality. The position can perhaps be
construed as an example of the feminist dilemma of "describing yet
changing,"43 that is, allowing for existing differences so as not to
punish women for these differences, while providing a model of
change in which the inequalities and negative connotations
underlying the differences are not perpetuated. This dilemma can
be seen as an alternative formulation of the difference dilemma. It
focuses on the need to affirm differences without recreating them,
or, at least, without recreating the negative construction of them.
In Pelech, the rule of private ordering can be seen to provide the
normative model for change towards which the regulation of
separation agreements should move, in order to eliminate the
underlying inequalities produced by women's economic dependence
on men. The exception of judicial intervention, on the other hand,
can be seen to provide the necessary description of the existing
differences in women's lives.
The general question which must be addressed is whether
the approach adopted in Pelech is an appropriate compromise. Is it
successful at bridging the gap between the competing approaches to
the enforcement of separation agreements and to gender equality?
Does it overcome the dilemma of difference? The evaluation of
this approach must consider whether it contains an adequate
description of women's difference, and, on the other side of the
dilemma, whether it posits an appropriate normative model for
change. At a deeper level, we must also ask whether an approach
in which one foot is planted firmly in each model of gender equality
can accurately be described as having moved beyond the dilemma of
43 See E. Schneider, "Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the
Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering" (1987) 9 Women's Rights L Rep. 195 at 200
wherein one of the dilemmas for feminist legal theory is described in terms of "How do we
develop legal theory and practice that is not only accurate to the realities of women's
experience but also takes account of complexity and allows for change"?
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difference, or whether it is more accurately characterized as simply
straddling the dilemma. Are the competing models of gender
equality and the two sides of the difference dilemma reconcilable in
the manner adopted by the decision in Pelech, or is the decision
internally inconsistent? Is a compromise between the competing
conceptions possible at all, or, are they irreconcilable?
In posing these questions, it is important to note that the
problem with Wilson J.'s compromise - both describing and
providing change - is not that it attempts to embrace two
irreconcilable approaches to gender equality and is therefore
inconsistent. Accepting inconsistencies and contradictions may be an
integral part of coming to terms with these difficult dilemmas. If
the construction of our reality is itself inconsistent and contradictory,
then our attempt to describe this reality must not shy away from
recognizing and affirming these inconsistencies.44 Rather, revealing
inconsistencies may be essential in both describing our world as it
presently exists and in prescribing normative models for changing it.
As Martha Minow argues:
... [N]eglect of potentially inconsistent or antagonistic meanings for the norms that
propel and inspire reforms could well give rise to disappointing results, and
acknowledgement of competing meaning might help explain disappointments.
45
While the allegation of inconsistency does not deliver a fatal blow
to a model for describing yet changing it, it is nevertheless important
to reveal these inconsistencies in order to see where we think we
are coming from, where we think we are going, and whether we can
actually get there from here.
M. Minow, "Consider the Consequences" (1986) 84 Mich. L. Rev. 900 at 910.
45 Ibid at 911. See S. Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1986) at 164:
... [Tlensions, contradictions and ambivalences within and between theories are not
always bad... Coherent theories in an obviously incoherent world are either silly
and unintereqting or oppressive and problematic, depending upon the degree of
hegemony they manage to achieve... Coherent theories in an apparently coherent
world are even more dangerous, for the world is always more complex than such
unfortunate hegemonic theories can grasp.... Not that we should try to produce
incoherent theories but that we should try to fashion conceptual schemes that are
more alert to the complex and often beneficial ways in which the modernist world
is falling apart.
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An evaluation of Wilson J.'s compromise can be divided into
two separate but inextricably linked questions, each relating to one
side of the describing yet changing dilemma. One asks whether the
model provides an adequate description of differences. The other
asks whether the compromise provides an appropriate normative
model.
This distinction suggests that normative and descriptive
issues are analytically distinct, neglecting the normative content of
any ostensibly descriptive analysis. It is difficult, if not impossible, to
address one of the questions independently of the other as the
answer to one necessarily implicates an answer to the other. For
example, the limited extent to which Pelech recognizes difference is
intricately connected to the underlying normative approach of the
Supreme Court of Canada trilogy.4 6 The attempt to examine these
questions separately must therefore at least begin from an
acknowledgement of the inextricable connection, and thus of the
arbitrary and even artificial nature of the construction of these
questions as distinct.
V. THE DESCRIPTIVE NARRATIVE
A. The Recognition of Difference: Economic Dependence in Pelech
I will first consider whether the compromise in Pelech has
adequately accommodated difference. The limited exception to the
rule of formal equality is the Court's recognition of women's
economic dependence on men. While arguing that too much
recognition of this difference would simply recreate it, the Court
was willing to recognize a limited exception to the rules of formal
equality, namely, when the radical change in circumstances was
causally connected to the marriage. A more detailed examination of
this test will demonstrate that it is highly restrictive and will do little
to alleviate the impact of the difference on the lives of dependent
spouses upon marital breakdown.
46 See bifra, at 338-39.
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The test in Pelech for the variation of separation agreements
comprises two steps. The first step requires a radical change in
circumstances between the time of the agreement and the variation
application. We must first ask what would constitute a radical
change of circumstances within the meaning of the test. Lenore
Weitzman's studies about the economic effect of marital breakdown
on women show that women experience an average 73 percent
decrease in standard of living in the first year of divorce.4 7 If such
a decrease is demonstrated to be the norm for women on marital
breakdown, would it constitute a radical change in circumstances?
While the three cases give little indication of how much change is
required, some guidance may be derived from the Court's discussion
of the second branch of the test, and from the application of the
test to the facts of the cases.
The Court emphasizes that the mere fact that an ex-spouse
is receiving public assistance, is unable to work, or suffers from ill
health does not justify the variation of a separation agreement unless
the condition is causally related to the marriage.48 However, this
emphasis implies that such factors may at least satisfy the
requirement of radical change. The implication is supported by the
Pelech application of this branch of the test, wherein the Court was
willing to conclude that Mrs. Pelech's circumstances constituted a
radical change.
However, the scope of the radical change in circumstances
is limited by the time restrictions as the change must occur between
the time of the agreement and the time of the variation application.
In Richardson,49 the Court held that because Mrs. Richardson was
unemployed and receiving public assistance at the time of the
agreement, there. was no change in circumstance between the time
of the separation agreement and the time of the variation
application. Therefore, the requirement of radical change is only
47 L Weitzman, Te Divorce Revolution, supra, note 30 at 323. See also MJ. Mossman,
"Family Law and Social Welfare," supra, note 29, illustrating the correlation between divorce
and the feminization of poverty in Canada.
48 Pelech, supra, note 2; Richardson, supra, note 3.
49 Richardson, ibid.
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fulfilled if the decrease in a woman's standard of living occurs within
the time limits.
The requirement of foreseeability similarly narrows this
branch of the test. According to the test in Pelech, as further
elaborated in Richardson, the change in circumstances must have
been unforeseeable at the time of the agreement 50 In Richardson,
Wilson J. held that the parties' expectations about restricting spousal
support to one year were not clear, and that without evidence of a
common expectation, the separation agreement should be upheld.
She also found that the possibility of Mrs. Richardson being
unemployed after a year of spousal support was not unforeseeable
at the time of the agreement.
An objective test of foreseeability severely limits the
circumstances in which the court will be willing to intervene in
separation agreements and further limits the extent to which the
difference of dependency will be taken into account. It imposes an
onerous burden on the parties to reasonably anticipate the future
consequences of economic dependence. Is it reasonable to expect
the parties on marital breakdown to be in a position to appreciate
these consequences, to be able to turn their minds to, and provide
for all future contingencies of economic dependence? This problem
is exemplified in Richardson where the parties turned their minds to
the issue but failed to adequately appreciate the future effects of
the dependency.
Furthermore, it may be the very circumstances of economic
dependency that put women in the position of being unable to
predict their future circumstances according to the reasonable person
standard. A woman's lack of experience in the labour market may
preclude her from an appreciation of her own marketability. We
must ask how adequately the difference of economic dependence is
being accommodated if this very difference may preclude the woman
from satisfying the requirements of the test.
The second step of the test requires that the change in
circumstances be causally connected to patterns of economic
50 It is unclear whether the requirement of foreseeability constitutes a third and separate
step of the test, or whether the issue of foreseeability goes to the determination of radical
change in circumstances. MacLeod, in his annotation of the trilogy (1987), 7 R.F.L. (3d) 225
at 229, suggests that it is a separate step in a three-step test.
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dependency in the marriage. Wilson J. held in Pelech that this
determination is a factual one to be made by the trial judge.
51
However, a review of the Richardson application of this branch of
the test further reveals the Court's understanding of this
requirement. Wilson J. found no evidence that Mrs. Richardson's
unemployment could be attributed to a pattern of economic
dependence during the marriage. She held that since Mrs.
Richardson had worked during the marriage, it cannot be said that
the marriage atrophied her skills or impaired her marketability.
It is difficult to see how Mrs. Richardson's unemployment at
the end of the year was not engendered by the patterns of economic
dependency during the marriage. While Mrs. Richardson did work
for the first seven years of the twelve-year marriage, she withdrew
from the labour market for five years of the marriage following the
birth of her child. Her absence from the labour market was directly
related to her role in the marriage, a role which made her
economically dependent on her husband for that period. As
Laforest J. notes in his dissenting opinion:
During the years she stayed home with the children, her skills would, in my view,
not only have atrophied, she would not have been able to gain the new skills that
are so necessary today in her field as well as in others. To use the words of Judge
Rosalie Abella, "The years when the husband was increasing his educational and
career prospects, were years which increasingly diminished the wife's prospects in
the labour force" [citation omitted]. Nor must one overlook that Mrs. Richardson
is now in her mid-forties and must find time and energy to care for a child, factors
that are by no means negligible in assessing her competitive position as against
younger people with recent training. Her present situation thus flows directly from
the marriage.52
Furthermore, Wilson J. did not consider the relative
contributions of Mrs. Richardson to the family's finances. Mrs.
Richardson worked as a clerk-typist, a traditionally female and thus
low-paying occupation. Wilson J. seems to assume that economic
51 Pelech, supra, note 2 at 270: "Each marriage relationship creates its own economic
pattern from which self sufficiency or dependency of the partners flows. The assessment of
the extent of that pattern's post-marital impact is essentially a matter for the judge of first
instance."
5 2 Rchardso,, supra, note 3 at 325. The internal citation is from "Economic Adjustment
on Marriage Breakdown: Support" in Family Law and Social Policy Workshop Series, Faculty
of Law, University of Toronto, 14 January 1982 at 19.
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self-sufficiency results from full-time employment, but in view of the
significant wage differentials between male- and female-dominated
occupations, the assumption is problematic. In addition to being
totally economically dependent on her husband for five years, Mrs.
Richardson may also have been partially dependent on him during
the seven years of her full-time employment. However, the Pelech
test does not seem to contemplate broader social factors, such as
the wage differential, in assessing the causal relation between the
change in circumstances and the marriage. The causal connection
contemplated by the test seems to require total dependence
throughout the marriage, so that the marriage alone can be said to
have caused the dependence and the subsequent change in
circumstances.
We have to ask whether it makes sense to speak of a causal
relationship in such direct and individual terms in the context of a
discussion of women's economic dependence and inequality.
53
Women's economic dependence is not produced exclusively by the
particular patterns of the family. The assumption of economic
dependence underlies, and is recreated by, a multiplicity of social
relationships and social institutions.
On the problem of attempting to construct the injury inflicted upon women by
pornography in terms of an individual model of causality, C. MacKinnon, "Not a Moral
Issue" (1984) 2 Yale L & Pol'y Rev. 321 at 338 [hereinafter "Not a Moral Issue"] writes:
"Its causality is essentially collective and totalistic and contextual. To reassert atomistic linear
causality as a sine qua non of injury - you cannot be harmed unless you are harmed through
this etiology - is to refuse to respond to the true nature of this specific kind of harm." See
also M. Horowitz, "The Doctrine of Objective Causation" in D. Kairys, ed., Politics of Law
(New York. Pantheon Books, 1982).
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The market is one example s4 On average, women's wages
are two-thirds of men's wages. One assumption underlying the
valuation of women's labour is that women do not support their
families and are economically dependent on their husbands 5 This
assumption of economic dependency adversely affects even those
women who have not been economically dependent within the
marriage. Similarly, social welfare assistance continues to be
predicated on the assumption of women's economic dependence and
serves to reinforce that condition s 6 How can we sensibly talk
54 Ontario Ministry of Labour, Women's Bureau, Women in the Labour Force "Basic
Facts" Update (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Labour, 1982); KE. Mahoney, "Overview. Equal
Pay for Work of Equal Value" in E.D. Pask, KE. Mahoney & CA. Brown eds, Women, the
Law and the Economy (Toronto: Butterworths, 1985) where it is indicated that women
employed in full-time jobs earn only 58 cents compared to every dollar earned by working
men, and that women earning the minimum wage outnumber men 2 to 1. L. Weitzman, The
Divorce Revolution, supra, note 30 at 351:
[W]ith women's current disadvantages in the labour market, getting a job cannot be
the only answer - because it does not guarantee a woman a way out of poverty.
Even with full-time employment one-third of the women cannot earn enough to
enable them and their children to live above the poverty level. The structure of the
job market is such that only half of full-time female workers are able to support two
children without supplemental income from either the children's fathers or the
government.
55 M. Leighton, "Handmaids' Tales: Family Benefits Assistance and the Single Mother-
Led-Family" (1987) 45 U.T. Fac. L Rev. 324 at 329 [hereinafter "Handmaids' Tales":
"Working class women, however, had never experienced the sexual division of labour, which
the cult of motherhood presupposed. They and often their children, worked both inside the
home and in the market economy. Yet the middle class ideology of motherhood was
incorporated into and considerably strengthened male trade unionists' demands for "family
wage." See also A. Vanderpol, "Dependent Children, Child Custody and the Mothers
Pensions: The Transformation of State-Family Relations in the Early Twentieth Century"
(1982) 29 Social Problems 228.
56 See S. Law, "Women, Work, Welfare and the Preservation of Patriarchy" (1983) 131
U. Pa. L Rev. 1249 at 1251 regarding how American welfare policy impedes women's access
to the labour market and denies the value of women's traditional non-wage abour:. "Ultimately
federal welfare and labour policy, by denying the value of women's work in the wage market
and in the home, can most reasonably be understood as serving to protect the dominance of
men in the wage market and in the home. The controlling assumption is that marital stability,
and the family itself, depend upon male economic dominance." See generally, M. Leighton,
"Handmaids' Tales," ibid.; M.J. Mossman, "Family Law and Social Welfare" supra, note 29 at
50: "Formerly dependent on their husbands, their independence and equality in marriage
breakdown may lead to dependence on social welfare programs"; MJ. Mossman & M.
McLean, "Toward a New Equality," supra, note 29 at 98: "... [l]n many cases, the social
welfare system seems to 'presume' the availability of family support based on the married (or
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about a causal relationship on an individual basis, in light of the
construction of social institutions and relationships, upon this
assumption?
When economic dependence is seen in its broader context of
mutually constituting social relationships, we can see how the
question of harm being caused to one individual woman by the
marital relationship is somewhat distorted. While the sexual division
of labour within the individual marital relationship is undoubtedly an
important factor in explaining why some women are hurt by divorce,
the more general societal factors contributing to the construction of
economic dependence cannot be ignored. When analyzed on a
group, rather than individual, basis economic dependency is
"essentially collective and totalistic and contextual."57 Yet, the
decision in Pelech demands individual causality. Only if an individual
causal relationship can be established is the former spouse found to
be responsible. If there is no such causal relationship, then the
state must assume responsibility.
Wilson J. defended her principled approach to the
enforcement of separation agreements on the ground that such
recognition will only serve to recreate difference.58 However, she
is silent on the implications of shifting the responsibility to the state
and forcing the state to recognize the difference. There is no
discussion of the nature of this responsibility or how dependence on
the state may perpetuate economic dependence and inequality. The
Court's refusal to recognize difference forces the state to recognize
it. Shifting the responsibility for dependence to the state simply
shifts the locus of the debate. Questions of recognizing or ignoring
difference, of breaking out of the dependency cycle, and of different
formerly married) status of women, thus denying eligibility to welfare benefits" H. Land,
"Changing Claims to Women's Maintenance" in M.D.A. Freeman, ed., supra, note 29 regarding
social insurance and social welfare schemes in England still based on assumption of a male
breadwinner.
57 C. MacKinnon, "Not a Moral Issue," supra, note 53.
58 Pelech, supra, note 2 at 268-70: "Otherwise, the obligation to support the f6rmer
spouse should be as in the case of any other citizen, the communal responsibility of the state."
Richardson, supra, note 3 at 311-12: "Otherwise a person who has once been married
continues to be contingently liable for the support of his or her former spouse for the
duration of their joint lives."
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models of the family representing different models of equality still
remain.59 While acknowledging the shift of responsibility from
spouse to state, the Court does not address the question of
recreating the difference in this new sphere. Wilson J.'s discussion
of the basis for rejecting the recognition of difference is
incomplete.60 Thus, not only does the approach in Pelech fail to
adequately address the problem of economic dependency within the
family, it completely fails to address the problem of reproducing
dependence in the other realms of market and state.
The Pelech decision goes a very short distance in
accommodating the modicum of gender difference that it does
recognize. It makes economic dependence engendered by the
marriage a factual matter to be determined by the trial judge.
However, the test as applied by Wilson J. is restrictive and under-
inclusive. This test will severely limit the circumstances in which the
difference of economic dependence will truly be taken into account
by the Courts. The approach adopted to accommodate women's
difference is, at the end of the day, one that will do little to
alleviate the harsh impacts of economic dependence on women in
marital breakdown.
VI. THE NORMATIVE NARRATIVE
In turning to a consideration of the normative model
informing the decision in Pelech, I will examine whether the private
ordering approach and the sameness model of gender equality upon
which it is predicated are appropriate and/or desirable models on
See authorities cited, supra, notes 28-9.
60 Yet, Wilson J. has shown in her extra-judicial writings that she is not insensitive to the
implications of shifting the responsibility from family to state. In "The Variation of Support
Orders" in Family Law: Dimensions of Justice, supra, note 30 at 61, 67:
What happens, though, when there are simply not enough resources to go around?
Can the Courts close their eyes to the reality of welfare and the role it is playing
in the support of families living near the poverty line? It seems to me that we really
have been closing our eyes to this in most Canadian jurisdictions.... [Me are
beginning to think about the relationship between family law as administered by the
Courts and welfare as administered by the state. We are groping for the right
principles and the right policies.
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which to structure relationships upon marital breakdown. As a means
of evaluating this normative model, I will attempt to reveal some of
the deeper stories being told by these competing models, some of
the deeper contradictions in the conception of the self, the self and
other, and, in turn, of the individual, family, and state.
A. Contract and the Family: Stories of Self, Other, and Neutrality
The private choice approach adopted as the rule in Pelech is
premised on the model of freedom of contract. The question which
must be addressed is why the model of contract is considered to be
applicable to the regulation of relationships upon marital breakdown.
What values does this contract model promote, and why is it
considered desirable to promote these values upon marital
breakdown?
Wilson J.'s implicit response to this question seems to be a
focus on the value of finality. In choosing between the competing
approaches, she noted that:
[e]very encouragement should be given to ex spouses to settle their financial affairs
in a final way so that they can put their mistakes behind them and get on with their
lives.... [I]t seems to me that parties who have declared their relationship at an end
should be taken at their word. They made the decision to marry and they made
the decision to terminate their marriage. Their decisions should be respected.
They should be free to make new lives for themselves without an on-going liability
for future misfortunes which may befall the other.
6 1
From this passage, it is apparent that Wilson J. is also concerned
with the value of free choice. Marriage is seen as an exercise of
the individual's free choice, that is, the individual is free to enter
into marriage and free to terminate marriage. The marital
relationship is analogous to any other contractual relationship. Its
existence is based on the free will of the parties. An understanding
of the stories about self and other underlying the normative rule in
Pelech thus requires an understanding of the stories about self and
other of the model of contract.
The classical nineteenth century model of contract was based
on one of the fundamental premises of liberal political theory, that
61 Pelech, supra, note 2 at 262.
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is, on the liberal understanding of the self and the relationship
between self and other and the role of the state in regulating this
relationship.62 The liberal conception of the self is individualistic
and atomistic. The self is posited as a separate, autonomous unit
capable of free choice. This voluntarist self exists prior to its aims
and attachments - it is a self unconstituted by its relationships with
others.63 Rather, the self's relationship with others is but an exercise
of the self's free choice. 
64
This priority of the self over its ends leads to a non-
teleological conception of human nature. There can be no
transcendent conception of the good, no human telos to which all
individuals may aspire.65 Rather, it is the self which must be left
to choose its own ends, its own conception of the good life. This
priority of the self over its ends dictates a particular relationship
between the self and the state. This non-teleological conception of
human nature requires that the state be neutral as among competing
62 C. Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1981).
63 This Kantian notion of the self has perhaps its most influential modern day expression
in the liberalism of J. Rawis, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971) at
560: 'The self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by it, even a dominant end must be
chosen from among numerous possibilities." M. Sandel "Introduction" in M. Sandel, ed.,
Liberalism and its Critics (Oxford: Blackwell Press, 1984) at 5 describing this Kantian self:
'The priority of the self over the ends means I am never defined by my aims and attachments,
but always capable of standing back to survey and assess and possibly to revise them. This
is what it means to be a free and independent self, capable of choice."
64 M. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 1982)
at 133 describing this liberal self: "[W]hat separates us is in some important sense prior to
what connects us - epistemologically prior as well as morally prior. We are distinct
individuals first, then we form relationships and engage in cooperative arrangements with
others; hence the priority of plurality over unity."
65 S. Sherry, "Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication" (1986)
72 Va. L Rev. 545 [citing A. Maclntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame,
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981) at 133]: 'This view holds that there is no
unitary end toward which humans aspire, no transcendent concept of the good life. '[The]
variety and heterogeneity of human goods is such that their pursuit cannot be reconciled In
any single moral order'.,"
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conceptions of the good. 66 The state must not impose or prefer any
one conception of the good on the individual. The state can only
provide a framework of basic rights and liberties within which
individuals may pursue their own conceptions of the good.
This understanding of the self is the premise for the
enforcement of contracts in the classical model. As Gabel and
Feinman describe:
The legitimating image of classical contract law in the nineteenth century was the
ideal of free competition as the consequence of wholly voluntary interactions among
many private persons all of who were in their nature free and equal to one
another.
67
The independent, voluntarist self is seen to freely enter into a
contractual relationship with another independent self. The
relationship is an exercise of the individual's freedom of choice in
pursuit of his or her own conception of the good. The state is seen
to provide the legal framework for this contractual relationship, that
is, the framework for enforcing the obligations of these freely
choosing, voluntarist selves. The state can only oversee the contract
to ensure that the rules have been followed. Just as the state must
remain neutral among competing conceptions of the good, so it must
remain neutral as to the substantive content of a contractual bargain.
It cannot evaluate the content of the contract, to see whether it was
a good or a fair bargain, as such would involve measuring the
private agreement of the parties according to some objective
standard of good or fair contract, an exercise which would thus
involve the imposition of a particular conception of the good.
The application of contract doctrine to the regulation of the
affairs of spouses upon marital breakdown imports these liberal
conceptions of the self, and the self and other, into the marital
relationship. The marital relationship, indeed the family, becomes
Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, supra, note 64 at 5 describes
...this is [sic] the vision of the self that finds expression in the ideal of the state as
a neutral framework. On the rights-based ethic, it is precisely because we are
essentially separate, independent selves that we need a neutral framework, a
framework of rights that refuses to choose among competing purposes and ends.
If the self is prior to its ends, then the right must be prior to the good.
67 P. Gable & J. Feinman, "Contract Law as Ideology" in Kairys, supra, note 53 at 176.
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a voluntary association between autonomous, independent selves.
There are no obligations or duties beyond those voluntarily assumed.
As Wilson J. states in Pelech, "[T]hey made the decision to marry
and they made the decision to terminate their marriage. Their
decisions should be respected."68 The voluntarist self can freely
choose to enter the marriage, and freely choose to exit the marriage.
Since the self exists prior to its relationships, it remains
fundamentally unchanged upon the termination of the marital
relationship. The individual is free to get on with life, that is, to
exercise free will, and enter into relationships with others in pursuit
of his or her own conception of the good.
Similarly, the role of the Court in the family is to enforce
the contract. It cannot evaluate the fairness or content of the
separation agreement nor impose its own substantive conception of
how the contract ought to have been written.
Where parties, instead of resorting to litigation, have acted in a mature and
responsible fashion to settle their financial affairs in a final way ... it should not, in
my view, be undermined by courts concluding with the benefit of hindsight that
they should have done it differently
69
Rather, the Court must remain neutral and simply enforce the
agreement between freely choosing individuals.
This emphasis on state neutrality is significant, not only for
the underlying story of the individual and the state it contains, but
also for the story of difference it tells. The understanding of
neutrality as facial neutrality presents a second version of the
dilemma of difference. As Minow writes:
The second version of the dilemma is the riddle of neutrality.... Governmental
neutrality may freeze in place the past consequences of differences. Yet any
departure from neutrality in governmental standards uses governmental power to
make those differences matter and thus symbolically reinforces them.
70
68 Pelech, supra, note 2 at 270.
69 Pekch, ibid. at 271.
70 Minow, "Foreword," supra, note 25 at 12.
[VOL- 28 No. 2
Domestic Contracts
She further explains:
The dilemma of difference appears especially acute for a government committed to
acting neutrally. Neutral means might not produce neutral results, given historic
practices and social arrangements that have not been neutral.71
Facial neutrality ignores, and thus risks reinforcing, the non-neutral
impact of these apparently facially neutral policies. It is a reflection
of the sameness approach. By ignoring differences among individuals
and applying policies in an ostensibly facially neutral manner to all
individuals regardless of difference, it risks reinforcing the
differences. The emphasis on ,the principle of neutrality is
connected to the emphasis on formal equality, which is part of the
sameness approach to difference.
This insistence on formal equality and facial neutrality in
family law sits in direct contrast to the approach to equality
emerging in Canadian constitutional law. The Supreme Court of
Canada has explicitly endorsed an approach to equality that includes
a consideration of the non-neutral impact of state action,
notwithstanding its facial neutrality. The approach reflects, at least
in principle, a commitment to substantive rather than mere formal
equality.72
Moreover, the premise of state neutrality underlying the
conception of the self and the family in Pelech, while consistent with
the liberal stories of self and other, seems contradictory in the
broader regulatory context of family law. The state has intervened
extensively in the regulation of the marital and familial relationship.
Statutes at both the provincial and federal levels provide a
comprehensive regulatory scheme governing the range of these
71 Ibid. at 22.
7 2 See Andrews v. Law SocieV of British Columbia, supra, note 18; R. v. Big M Drug Mart
Lud. (1985), 18 D.L.R. (4th) 321 at 350: "In my view, both purpose and effect are relevant
in determining constitutionality;, either an unconstitutional purpose or an unconstitutional
effect can invalidate legislation"; Re C.N.R Co. and Canadian Human Rights Com'n (1983), 147
D.L.R. (3d) 312, aff'd on other grounds sub nom.; Re Bhinder and CN.R. (1985), 23 D.L.R.
(4th) 481; Re Ontario Human Rights Com'n and Simpson-Sears Ltd (1985), 23 D.LR. (4th) 321
regarding impact/effects analysis in discrimination; Action Travail des Femmes v. Canadian
National Railway Co. (1987), 40 D.L.R. (4th) 193 regarding systemic discrimination.
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relationships.73 The state has expressly provided for the availability
of judicial review of separation orders.74
Why does the Supreme Court of Canada continue to insist
on the principles of neutrality and formal equality in the area of
family law? First, the individualistic conception of the family, and
the role of the state as neutral arbitrator, can be seen as part of a
historical trend in the regulation of the family.75 Family law reform
in the last two decades has moved from gender-based rules and
distinctions to a conception of the family as an equal partnership
between two equal and independent individuals. 76 Family law has
shifted to a model of formal equality and a concomitant focus on
individual rights, expressed through the adoption of the general
principles of equality and independence.77 According to this model,
73 See generally, Child And Family Services Act, S.O. 1984, c. 55; Children's Law Reform
Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 68; Divorce Act, S.C. 1986, c. 4; Family Law Act 1986, S.O. 1986, c. 4;
Family Beneflis Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 151; Minors Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 292; Maniage Act Ontario,
R.S.O. 1980, c. 256; Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 488.
74 Under section 17 of the Divorce Ac, 1985, the court is given discretion to vary
maintenance orders. The principle that a maintenance order does not extinguish the
jurisdiction of the court derives from Hyman v. Hyman, [1929] A.C. 601, and was affirmed in
Pelech, supra, note 2 at 252-53.
75 Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution, supra, note 30 at 368: The new divorce laws
"adopt a laissez-faire attitude toward both marriage and divorce. They leave both the terms
of the marriage contract - and the option to terminate it - squarely in the hands of individual
parties"; Glendon, The New Family, supra, note 30 at 52: individual family members are
increasingly treated as economically independent for the purposes of the law of support.
76 See authorities cited, supra, note 30. While provincial family law statutes continue to
be based on a hybrid of formal and substantive equality approaches to family law, the judicial
interpretation thereof has overwhelmingly continued in the direction of formal equality. The
Pelech decision, supra, note 2, and subsequent decisions giving far-reaching application to the
reasoning in Pelech, epitomize this trend.
77 Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution, supra, note 30 at 367: The new divorce laws "...
abandoned the gender-based assumptions of the traditional law in favour of standards for
treating men and women 'equally' in alimony and property awards." Fineman, "Implementing
Equality," supra, note 29; Mossman, "Family Law and Social Welfare," supra, note 29; M.
Eichler, "Family Policy in Canada: from Where to Where" in R.S. Abella & M.L. Rothman
eds, Justice Beyond Orwell (Montreal: Editions Y. Blais, 1985); Payne "The Financial
Consequences," supra, note 30; Olsen, "The Family and the Market," supra, note 29 at 1517:
"The liberalization of the family was marked by shifts toward equal juridical rights and the
withdrawal of the state. This trend has continued to the present, with the family coming to
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upon marital breakdown, the state must remain neutral among
competing substantive conceptions of the family and of its own
normative conception of the good. It must simply apply the general
principles of equality and independence. The liberal understanding
- that the voluntarist self and the state as neutral arbitrator underlie
the traditional model of contract - has been incorporated into, and
become the stories underlying, the regulation of the family. 78
However, the insistence on neutrality must furthermore be
seen in the context of the continuing resonance of the idea of the
family as a private sphere. The family is commonly understood as a
sanctuary from the demands of the public world, as a haven in a
heartless world. 79 Notwithstanding the extensive regulation of the
family, the public-private distinction continues to inform the social
understanding of the family, that is, the construction of the family
as private and the state as public, and thus of the family as beyond
the proper reach of state intervention.
However, this contrast between the extensive public
regulation of the family and the understanding of the family as
private is indicative of the artificiality of the public-private
distinction. As Minow notes:
Once government has the authority to intervene which it may or may not exercise
- and, indeed, the authority to consider its own authority to intervene - the idea
of state intervention fails to have a sharp edge.
This dull edge of state intervention is a manifestation of the
untenable nature of the public-private distinction. The private
family is not simply an a priori entity - it does not exist prior to the
assume more of the characteristics associated with the market." See also, Glendon, The New
Family and the New Property, supra, note 30.
78 See Payne, "The Financial Consequences," supra, note 30; Mossman "Family Law and
Social Welfare," supra, note 29; Fineman, "Implementing Equality," supra, note 29; Olsen,
MThe Family and the Market," supra, note 29; Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution, supra, note
30; Glendon, The New Family and the New Property, supra, note 30.
79 Christopher Laseh, Haven in a Heartless World:- The Family Beseiged (New York:
Basic Books, 1977).
80 M. Minow, "Beyond State Intervention in the Family- For Baby Jane Doe" (1985)
18 Mich. J. L Ref. 933 at 936-3-7.
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state but rather, must be seen as constructed by the state. Nikolas
Rose constructs different aspects of the family, such as marriage,
divorce, and sexual behaviour, as:
[p]ersonal, private and subjective makes them appear to be outside the scope of
the law as a fact of nature, whereas in fact non-intervention is a socially
constructed, historically variable and inevitably political decision. The state defines
as "private" those aspects of life which it will not intervene, and then, paradoxically,
uses this privacy as the justification for its non-interventionP
The decision in Pelech can be understood in this context. The Court
uses its own authority to intervene, and in fact to consider its own
authority to intervene, to establish a principle of non-intervention in
separation agreements. The Court has chosen to structure its
discretion in terms of a general principle of limited intervention. In
effect the Court uses its power to define separation agreements as
private, and then uses this notion of privacy as the justification for
non-intervention.
Furthermore, the significance of neutrality in Pelech must be
seen in the context of the convergence of the liberal models of
contract and family. The model of contract is similarly based on the
construction of the market as private, as prior to and beyond the
reach of the state. Both the family and the market are constructed
as the private sphere, as the sphere of individual choice, as the
sphere beyond the legitimate reach of the state.82 The vision that
emerges is that if contracts are private, and the family is private,
then family contracts must be quintessentially private. It is this
convergence of the market and the family that makes the demand
for state neutrality, and for the private ordering of relationships
upon marital breakdown through separation agreements, so powerful.
The stories of the self, self and other, and authority of the market
81 N. Rose, "Beyond the Public/Private Division: Law, Power and the Family" (1987) 14
J. L. & Society 61 at 64-65. For a general discussion of the public/private distinction see K.
O'Donovan, Sexual Divisions in Law (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985); F. Olsen,
'"he Myth of State Intervention" (1985) 18 Mich. L Rev. 835; J. Fudge, 'The Public/Private
Distinction: The Possibilities of and the Limits to Further Feminist Struggles" (1987) 25
Osgoode Hall I.J. 485; M. McIntosh, 'The Family, Regulation and the Public Sphere" in G.
McLennan et aL eds, State and Society In Contemporary Britain (Cambridge: Polity Press,
1984).
82 See Olsen, 'The Family and the Market," supra, note 29.
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reinforce, and are reinforced by, the stories of self, self and other,
and authority underlying family law.
These stories of self and other which inform the normative
model can be seen to be intricately related to the limited recognition
and accommodation of difference in Pelech.s3 The very recognition
of the empirical difference arguably stretches the liberal conception
of the self as separate and autonomous to its outer limits. Women
are different because their life situations have been different from
men's. Their relationships with others, and their role within these
relationships, have been substantially different and have affected the
nature of who they are. It is because of their role in the traditional
division of labour in the marital relationship as domestic labourer
and child-rearer, dependent on their spouse for economic support,
that women are different, and consequently, not economically self-
sufficient upon marital breakdown. This is not the story of a
voluntarist self, but of a self whose aims and attachments are at least
partly constitutive, a self which is affected by its relationship with
others.
We might ask at this point how an approach based on the
liberal concept of the self can reconcile such a recognition of
difference, which seems to implicate a self at least partly constituted
by its relationships? However, the issue is not one of consistency.
8 4
Rather, the important point is to recognize the connections between
the normative and descriptive narratives of difference in Pelech.
The normative model, with its stories about the self and other, limits
the differences which can be recognized. It is the model that
informs the Court that the line must be drawn at a narrow
recognition and accommodation of empirical difference to ensure
that the exception does not undermine the rule.
83 See text, supra, at 323-30.
84 See text, supra, at 322 and notes 44-45.
1990] 339
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
B. Challenge to the Liberal Stories of Self, Other, and the State
The liberal stories of the self, other, and the state have come
under considerable criticism. The liberal understanding of the self
has been challenged from a multiplicity of disciplines and
perspectives. This essay will examine, and subsequently interrogate,
two such challenges to the liberal self, namely, those presented by
feminist object-relations theory and by communitarian theory.
Feminist object-relations theory, which refers to a literature
of feminist psychoanalysis and psychology, has been particularly
influential in the feminist critique of the liberal self. Feminist
psychoanalytic theory has explored gender difference as constructed
in the relationship of the child to the mother.85 Nancy Chodorow,
for example, has argued that there are different "relational
capacities" and senses of self between women and men, and that
these differences are produced by the sexual division of labour in
which women mother8 6 She argues that the processes of separation
and individuation are different for girls and boys because of the
different relationships that daughters and sons have with their
mothersfs7 Female identity formation occurs in the context of an
ongoing relationship between mothers and daughters. Daughters, in
85 For further discussion of the feminist object-relations theory, see generally N.
Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering. Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender
(Berkeley:. University of California Press, 1978); D. Dinnerstein, The Mermaid and the
Minotaur (New York: Harper & Row, 1976); J. Benjamin, "The Bonds of Love: Rational
Violence and Erotic Domination" in H. Eisenstein & A. Jardine eds, The Future of Difference
(New York Barnard College Women's Center, 1980) at 41; J. Baker Miller, Toward a New
Psychology of Women (Boston: Beacon Press, 1976); N. Noddings, Caring: A Feminine
Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); A.
Wilson Schaef, Women's Reality (Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1981).
86 Chodorow, supra, note 85 at 76: "An account of the early mother-infant relationship
in contemporary Western society reveals the overwhelming importance of the mother in
everyone's psychological development, in their sense of self, and in their basic relational
stance."
87 J. Flax, "Political Philosophy and the Patriarchal Unconscious: A Psychoanalytic
Perspective on Epistemology and Metaphysics" in S. Harding & M.B. Hiutikka eds,
Discovering Reality (Boston: Kluwer, 1983) at 251: "Separation means establishing a firm sense
of differentiation from the mother, of possessing one's own physical and mental boundaries.
Individuation means establishing a range of characteristics, skills, and personality traits which
are uniquely one's own.
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experiencing themselves as female, identify themselves with their
mothers, fusing the experience of attachment with identity formation.
Male identity formation is experienced by sons in differentiating
themselves from their mothers, and thus involves a more severe
"individuation and a more defensive firming of ego boundaries."
Furthermore, the daughter's process of gender identity formation, of
learning what it is to be female, of identifying with her mother,
takes place in the context of a personal relationship. However, the
son's process of gender identity formation, of learning what it is to
be male, does not occur in the context of a personal relationship.
Rather, due to the absence of the father, this gender identity
formation occurs "through identification with cultural images of
masculine models."88 Chodorow concludes that "the basic feminine
sense of self is connected to the world, the basic masculine sense of
self is separate."
' 9
The cognitive, moral development studies of Carol Gilligan
have similarly been influential in the feminist critique of the liberal
self? Gilligan identifies two voices in moral development, which
she labels as male and female. However, it is important to note
that she argues that there is a gender link as a tendency, but not a
direct gender correlation to the two voices. Through her studies of
moral development, she has argued that male moral development
tends to focus on individuation and autonomy whereas female moral
development tends to focus on caretaking and relationship with
others. She argues that whereas men's conception of morality
involves abstract principles of fairness and a concomitant focus on
rights and rules, women's conception of morality is concerned
primarily with the activity of care, and focuses on relationships and
responsibilities. The male morality of rights differs from the female
morality of responsibility in both its emphasis on separation rather
than connection and its consideration of the individual rather than
88 Chodorow, supra, note 85 at 176.
89 Ibid. at 169.
90 C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).
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the relationship as primary.91 This difference in morality is argued
to reflect a fundamental difference in self-definition between men
and women. Whereas the male self is defined through separation,
and measured against an abstract ideal of perfection, the female self
is delineated through connection to others and through particular
activities of care.92 For men, the moral imperative is perceived as
an "injunction to respect the rights of others and thus to protect
from interference the rights to life and self-fulfilment. "93 For women,
however, the moral imperative is perceived as "an injunction to care,
a responsibility to discern and alleviate" pain and trouble.94 Moral
dilemmas for women are not cast as a contest of conflicting rights
in which one must decide how to exercise one's rights without
interfering with the rights of others. Rather, women perceive moral
dilemmas in terms of conflicting responsibilities, in which the only
acceptable resolution is that which is most inclusive of everyone's
needs.95
The feminist critique is often related to the critique of the
liberal self emanating from a more general political theory of
communitarianism. According to communitarian theory, the self
must be understood as at least partly constituted by its communities.
The self does not exist prior to its social relationships, nor its aims
and attachments, but rather, is constituted by these relationships,
aims, and attachments. This communitarian challenge has rejected
the liberal conception of the "disengaged self' or "unencumbered
91 Ibid. at 19.
92 Ibid. at 35.
93 Ibid. at 100.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid. at 59. Gilligan does not posit these moral differences as absolute, but rather,
as differences within a process of moral development, a process which remains incomplete
until a third stage of moral development is reached. She seems to suggest that the final stage
of moral development, the development to moral maturity, is thus also different for men and
women. Whereas men, whose moral development has focused on individuation and separation,
must learn the values of care and relationship, women, whose moral development has focused
on care and connection, must learn some degree of individuation, that is to overcome self
sacrifice, and to assert their individual interest.
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subject."96 The communitarian understanding of the self is described
by Sandel:
Communitarian critics of rights-based liberalism say we cannot conceive ourselves
as independent in this way, as bearers of selves wholly detached from our aims and
attachments. They say that certain of our roles are partly constitutive of the
persons we are - as citizens of a country, or members of a movement, or partisans
of a cause. But if we are partly defined by the communities we inhabit, then we
must also be implicated in the purposes and ends characteristic of these
communities. As Alasdair Maclntyre writes: "what is good for me has to be the
good for one who inhabits these roles." Open-ended though it be, the story of
those communities from which I derive my identity - whether family or city, tribe
or nation, party or cause. On the communitarian view, these stories make a moral
difference, not only a psychologcal one. They situate us in the world, and give our
lives their moral particularity."
Communitarian theory and feminist object-relations theory
have often been merged in considering the implications of the
theory for legal and political theory.98 The resulting critique, which
frequently draws upon both of these critiques of the liberal self
without distinguishing between them, is one which attacks the liberal
96
See generally C. Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1985); C. Taylor, "Atomism" in Alkis Kontus, ed., Powers, Possessions and
Freedom (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979) at 39; MacIntyre, After Vh'tue, supra,
note 65; M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Sandel, Liberalism and
the Limits of Justice, supra, note 64.
97 Sandel, "Introduction," supra, note 63 at 5-6.
98 The implications of this critique on legal theory and rights analysis has been widely
discussed. See generally K. Karst, "Woman's Constitution" (1984) Duke L.J. 447; J. Hardwig,
"Should Women Think in Terms of Rights" (1984) 94 Ethics 441; F. Oisen, "Statutory Rape:
A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis" (1984) 63 Tex. L Rev. 387; E. Schneider "The
Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives on the Women's Movement" (1986) 61 N.Y.U.
L Rev. 589 [hereinafter "Rights and Politics"]; C. Menkel-Meadow "Portia in a Different
Voice: Speculating on a Women's Lawyering Process" (1985) 1 Berkeley Women's L. J. 39; C.
Menkel-Meadow, "Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem
Solving" (1984) 31 U.C.LA. L Rev. 754; P. Spiegelman, "Court-Ordered Hiring Quotas After
Stotts: A Narrative on the Role of the Moralities of the Web and the Ladder in Employment
Discrimination Doctrine" (1985) 20 Harv. Civ. Rts.- Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 339; A. Scales, "The
Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence" (1986) 95 Yale Li. 1373; Sherry, "Civic Virtue," supra,
note 65. For a consideration of the implications of this critique on political theory more
generally, see A. Jaggar, Feminist Politics & Human Nature (Totowa NJ.: Rowman &
Allanheld, 1983); N. Hartsock, Money, Sex & Power: Toward a Feminist Historical Materialism
(New York: Layman, 1983); Flax, Discovering Really, supra, note 87; S. Benhabib & D.
Cornell eds, Feminism as Critique: On the Politics of Gender (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1987).
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self for failing to recognize the extent to which the self is relational.
It advocates the substitution of an understanding of the self, as
constituted in relation to others, as constituted in relationships.
C. Implications of the Challenge to the Liberal Self
The critique of the liberal self, and the notion of the self as
constituted in relation to others, has potentially far reaching
implications for liberal theory in general, and contract theory in
particular.99 For the purposes of this analysis, with its focus on the
enforcement of separation agreements, two possibly contradictory
implications can be drawn from this critique. First, it might suggest
that the understanding of the self as separate and autonomous is
based on a male understanding of the self, and thus reveals the male
norm as the unstated norm. Second, it challenges the very
understanding of the self posited by the dominant Western
philosophical tradition. Even the male understanding of the self as
separate and autonomous is revealed to have been forged in
relationship with others, in the context of a broader social structure.
On one level, the feminist object-relations approach suggests
that women and men have different senses of self and morality.
This idea of an epistemological gender difference between self and
morality, between ways of knowing the world, might make a
difference in our understanding of how and why women and men
contract, and particularly, of how these contracts are entered in the
context of a familial relationship. 1 ° To the extent that women
(whether some, most, or many) do not have the same sense of self
and morality as men, that is, to the extent that self and morality
might constitute a gender difference, the applicability of the contract
model to women comes into question!0 1 The paradigm contract is
based on the notion of two separate and autonomous individuals,
agreeing to enter into a contract when and only when it is perceived
99See authorities! cited, supra, note 98.
1 00 See, infra, 345-46.
101 See, infra, 360-62.
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by the two individuals to be mutually advantageous, that is, when the
contract is in the self interest of both parties to the contract.
However, if women's moral specificity is such that they are not
motivated by the maximization of their self interest, but rather may,
under certain circumstances, consider the interests of others, a
fundamental assumption underlying the justification for the
enforcement of contracts is undermined.
One conclusion that might be drawn from the critique of the
liberal self is that the liberal model of contract is predicated on a
male sense of self, and accordingly, the applicability of the model of
contract to women comes into question. This problem is highlighted
by domestic contracts which are made in the context of intimate
relationships, that is, contracts made between and involving the
individuals to whom women feel the strongest sense of responsibility
- their families - and thus for whom the sacrificing of self interest
is most likely. This problem is arguably most evident in the context
of separation agreements upon marital breakdown, when a woman
feels that she has initiated or caused the breakdown of the
relationship. According to this relational sense of self and morality,
a woman might feel that in asserting her self interest by leaving the
marriage, or causing the marriage to dissolve, she is inflicting hurt
on her others and violating her sense of her most fundamental
responsibilities. In this scenario, she might not be expected to
further assert her self interest in negotiating a separation agreement,
but rather, in the attempt to find a solution to this moral dilemma
which best accommodates the interests of all, she may sacrifice her
own self interest.
Furthermore, when constructed as a gender difference, this
relational self might be seen to present another dilemma of
difference. Failing to recognize the difference by adopting formal,
facially neutral equality will penalize women for their difference,
because the unstated norm in the ostensibly neutral standard is a
male norm. The "neutral' application of contract principles to
women and men alike may unduly burden women because they do
not conform to the male norm.
A woman may have entered the contract because she trusted
her husband, or because she thought it would be best for the others
in her family, or because she felt guilty at having caused or
contributed to the marital breakdown. According to the general
1990]
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principles and underlying assumptions of contract, these are not the
sorts of considerations which ought to be taken into account. The
failure to take these considerations, or this difference, into account
also means failure to value differences which may be valuable, that
is, the taking into account of the other in a contract decision. We
have to ask whether we really want to punish women who, in the
face of a personal crisis, did not attempt to maximize their self
interest. Furthermore, the failure to recognize this difference risks
recreating the difference of economic dependence and inequality.
By not recognizing the way she has sacrificed her self interest, the
woman will be left to suffer the economic consequences of her
contract and exacerbate the economic hardship she nevertheless
faces upon marital breakdown.
Yet to recognize this relational sense of self and morality as
a gender difference risks recreating traits of the difference which
are negative. The recognition of women's tendency to focus on
relationships and responsibilities, on the other instead of the self,
risks reinforcing the construction of woman as caretaker, as nurturer,
and as other-serving. It reinforces the construction of woman as
other.1
0 2
On a second level, the critique of the liberal self can be seen
to suggest that neither women nor men have voluntarist selves. The
convergence of the feminist object-relations critique and the
communitarian critique suggests that the self is not in fact prior to
its relationships and cannot be understood in isolation from its
relationships with others. Rather, these relationships are at least
partially constitutive of the self and the self can thus only be
understood in the context of these relationships. Accordingly, a
conclusion that can be drawn from this critique is that the liberal
model of contract is based on an impoverished and illusory notion
of the self. The critique of the liberal voluntarist self can thus be
seen to challenge the very conception of self underlying the model
of contract.
102 For developments on the theory of woman as other see S. de Beauvoir, The Second
Sex, trans. H.M. Parshley (New York: Knopf, 1953); H. Cixous, The Newly Born Women,
trans. B. Wing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986); L. Irigaray, This Sex
Which is Not One, trans. C. Porter (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); L. Irigaray,
Speculum of the Other Woman, trans. G.C. Gill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985).
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These two levels of implications flowing from the critique of
the liberal self, while seemingly contradictory on their face, are not
so. The second level can perhaps be seen to embrace the
implications of the first. Men may, to a much greater extent than
women, perceive themselves as separate and autonomous selves, and
their senses of self and morality may thus more closely approximate
the voluntarist self posited by the contract model. However,
according to the critique, the self is forged through relationship, it
is affected by its relationships, it is constituted by its relationships.
While it may have separate and autonomous traits, it is not
essentially a separate and autonomous self, and as such, undermines
a fundamental assumption underlying the enforcement of contracts.
The implications of the critique of the liberal self for the
enforcement of separation agreements are profound. It questions
the very normative framework on which Pelech is based and seems
to suggest an alternative framework, namely, one grounded in a
story of self as relational. According to this critique, underlying the
rule in Pelech is a story about the self, which although advanced as
a universal story, is a story about the male self and its understanding
of its interaction with others, an understanding which is then
advanced as the universal story. This story of the self and other
might thus be rejected, not only because it is not a universal story,
but moreover, because it tells an inadequate story about the
relationship between self and other.
However, in order to evaluate these implications and their
potential meaning to the analysis of Pelech, and before an alternative
normative framework can be advanced in place of the liberal story,
the concepts underlying the critique of the liberal self must be
further examined. The notions of difference and of relational self,
which have themselves been subject to powerful critiques, must be
further deconstructed if these concepts are to be useful in our
attempt to come to terms with the dilemmas presented by Pelech.
1990]
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VII. THE DILEMMA REVISITED
Are we alike? If you like. It's a little abstract. I don't quite understand "alike"?
Do you? Alike in whose eyes? in what terms? by what standard? with reference to
what third?
Luce Irigaray
When Our Lips Speak Together
7 03
The defining of difference has traditionally been linked to the exercise of power, to
those who have been in a position to say who is "different" and should therefore be
subordinate.
Hester Eisenstein
The Future of Difference04
A. The Critique of Difference
The analysis has, in effect, come full circle. I have tried to
show the fundamental dilemma of difference presented to the theory
and practice of gender equality, to unearth the manner in which this
dilemma presents itself in Pelech, and to argue how the attempt to
overcome the dilemma in Pelech is ultimately unsatisfactory.
However, we are still left with the unresolved dilemma and thus the
question of how to get beyond it.
The traditional feminist approaches to the question of gender
difference have been the subject of an incisive internal critique, a
critique which is part of a more general critique of the whole
spectrum of Western feminism, and which I believe may provide the
basis for an alternative approach to the questions of difference.
Rather than focusing on the question of whether or not to recognize
difference, an alternative approach has begun to emerge focusing on
the question of what we mean when we talk about difference, and
who we are talking about when we talk about difference. Unlike the
traditional approaches, which have been unable to get beyond their
103 L Irigaray, "When Our Lips Speak Together" in This Sex WMch is Not One, supra,
note 102 at 208.
104 H. Eisenstein, "Introduction" in The Future of Difference, supra, note 85 at xdii.
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own reflections, this emerging approach may provide a path through
the looking glass of the dilemma of difference.
The challenge to the traditional understanding of difference
has occurred on a number on interrelated levels. On one level it is
a challenge to the tendency to essentialize existing gender
differences, differences which are the product of a patriarchal
society. MacKinnon argues, for example, that the current social
construction of woman is a product of a world in which men have
the power to define, and have used this power to define women 05
According to MacKinnon, differences, including the differences in
self and morality identified by Gilligan and others, are the product
of the structures of dominance in society, that is, of the power of
men and the powerlessness of women, and any affirmation of these
differences constitutes an affirmation of these very structures of
dominance.
1 °6
On another level, it is a challenge to the tendency to ignore
difference within difference. It is a critique, from those who have
up to now remained voiceless and faceless in feminist theory and
practice, of the blindness of feminism to women who are not white
and not middle class and not heterosexual, and any of these things
that feminism has simply assumed when it speaks of women. It is,
in more direct words, an allegation of racism, of classism, of ageism,
of a whole range of ism's, from women who do not fit the model
upon which feminism was initially constructed. The critique is
internal, in so far as it emanates from those whom feminism claims
to represent and claims to speak on behalf of. Yet, as the voices
of those become heard, it becomes increasingly clear that these are
the voices of women that have not been represented by feminism,
these are voices which come from the outside, or as bell hooks
105 I. Marcus et aL, "The 1984 James McCormick Mitchell Lecture: Feminist Discourse,
Moral Values and the Law - A Conversation" (1985) 34 Buffalo L Rev. 11; C. MacKinnon,
Feminism Unmodified, supra, note 20; C. MacKinnon, The Seuwal Harassment of Working
Women (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979); C. MacKinnon, "Feminism, Marxism,
Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory" (1982) 7 Signs 515; C. MacKinnon, "Feminism,
Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence" (1983) 8 Signs 635.
106 C. MacKinnon, Feminism Unodified, supra, note 20 at 39: "Women value care
because men have valued us according to the care we give them, and we could probably use
some. Women think in relational terms because our existence is defined in relation to men.
Further, when you are powerless, you don't just speak differently. A lot, you don't speak."
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describes, from the margins!07 The critique is a critique of
blindness to difference within difference. Women may be as
different from one another as they are different from men. It is a
critique of the hierarchy of oppression, of the positing of gender as
the primary division and primary form of oppression in society.
It is at the same time a critique of the positing of an
essentialist woman.°a The fractured identities emerging from within
107 bell hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Centre (Boston: South End Press,
1984); Also, see bell hooks, Ain't I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism (Boston: South
End Press, 1981); A. Lorde, "Age, Race, Class & Sex: Women Redefining Difference" in A.
Lorde, Sister Outsider (Trumansburg, N.Y.: Crossing Press, 1984) at 114: "By and large within
the women's movement today, white women focus upon their oppression as women and ignore
differences of race, sexual preference, class and age." A. Lorde, "An Open Letter to Mary
Daly" in C. Moraga & G. Anzaldua eds, This Bridge Called My Back- Writings by Radical
Women of Color (Watertown, Mass.: Persephone Press, 1981); G. Joseph, "The Incompatible
Menage a Trois: Marxism, Feminism and Racism" in L. Sargernt, ed., Women and Revolution
(Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1981); H. Carby, "White Women Listen! Black Feminism and
the Boundaries of Sisterhood" in The Empire Strikes Back (London: Hutchinson in association
with the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham, 1982); M.
Kline, "Race, Racism and Feminist Legal Theory" (1989) 12 Harv. Women's L. Rev. 115; A.
Lorde, "The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House" in This Bridge Called
my Back as above; F. White "Listening to the Voices of Black Feminism" (1983) 18 Radical
America 7. The categories of internal and external begin to collapse in describing this
critique, for these are voices which are both inside and outside, and voices which are neither
inside nor outside.
108 M. Minow "Foreword," supra, note 25 at 62-63: "... [Bly urging the corrective of the
women's perspective, or even a feminist standpoint, feminists have jeopardized our own
challenge to simplification, essentialism, and stereotyping. Women fall into every category of
race, religion, class and ethnicity, and vary in sexual orientation, handicapping conditions, and
other sources of assigned difference. Claims to speak from women's point of view, or to use
women as a reference point, threaten to obscure this multiplicity and install a particular view
to stand for the views of' all." Also, see Feminism as Critique, supra, note 98 at 13: "How can
feminist theory base itself upon the uniqueness of the female experience without reifying
thereby one single definition of femaleness as the paradigmatic one - without succumbing, that
is, to an essentialist discourse on gender"? Harding, supra, note 45 at 163: "... [Clan there
be a feminist epistemological standpoint when so many women are embracing 'fracture
identities' as Black women, Asian women, Native American women, working class women,
lesbian women? Do not these identities undercut the standpoint assumption that common
experiences as women create identities capable of providing the grounds for a distinctive
epistemology and politics." She concludes, on the basis of the postmodern challenge to
feminist epistemology, that "[tjhere is no 'woman' to whose social experience the feminist
empiricist and standpoint justificatory strategies can appeal: there are, instead, women:
chicanos and latinos, black and white, the 'offshore' women in the electronics factories in
Korea and those in the Caribbean sex industry." L Nicholson, Feminism and Postmodernism
(London: Routledge, 1990).
350
1990] Domestic Contracts 351
the feminist movement have begun to undermine the very notion
of a general concept of woman, of a universal or an essential nature.
At yet another level, it is part of a more general post-
modem challenge to the very notion of any generalized construction
of a universal or essential nature of difference, of any universals or
essences that must be discovered1 09 It is part of the challenge to
the very foundations of Western thought and to notions of
rationality, objectivity, and truth. Alice Jardine writes of the
postmodem challenge:
The clearest way, perhaps, to contain in one word the gesture they have performed
on the texts and contexts of humanist ideology is to focus on the word
denaturalization: they have denaturalized the world that humanism naturalized, a
world whose anthro-pology and anthro-centricism no longer make sense ... [o]ver
the past century, those master (European) narratives - history, philosophy, religion
- which have determined our sense of legitimacy in the West have undergone a
series of crises in legitimation.p
It is a rejection of meta-narratives, of the telling of one story-11
Rather than an external truth to be discovered by human reason,
knowledge is understood as a product of the vantage point of the
observer, and social knowledge, as the power of the observer to
impose his own views on others. The rejection of the one true
109 It is, of course, a ludicrous task to attempt to encapsulate the entire postmodern
assault on rationality, objectivity, indeed on the whole of the Western philosophic tradition
in a few short passages. The very nature of the postmodern project eludes the telling of such
a simple story. However, with this self conscious apology in mind, I will attempt to tell just
such a story.
Postmodernism is a breakdown of the stories that we have always told ourselves. The
stories about the nature of the universe, the nature of society, the nature of government, the
nature of our selves no longer seem to make sense. The stories no longer hold together, and
once we start pulling on the loose threads of the stories, the whole stories dissolve and
unravel.
110 A. Jardine, Gynesis: Configurations of Women and Modernity (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1985) at 24.
l J.F. Lyotard, La Condition Postmodene (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1979) at 7
defining the postmodern as "incredulity with regard to the master-narrative."
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story is at the same time the recognition of the multiplicity of
stories, coming from a multiplicity of perspectives!
12
In the context of law, it can perhaps be seen as an attempt
to denaturalize law, to unravel the master narratives in legal
reasoning that has held law together, to illustrate the contingency of
law, to question the authority of these meta-narratives, and thus,
the authority of law. It is at the same time an attempt to bring new
voices, to tell new stories, into the legal arena, an attempt to expand
law to include a multiplicity of perspectives.
The postmodern challenge to rationality, objectivity, and the
foundations of knowledge has lead to allegations of nihilism and
relativism. If no perspective can make any higher claim to the truth
than any other, if no perspective can be absolutely grounded, can
we speak at all? If we accept that there is no point of view that
cannot be treated as a point of view,113 can we attempt to persuade
by argument, or do we fall into the abyss of nihilism. In the
context of the feminist project, the problem presented by the post
modern challenge is how can we even speak of woman, of gender,
and of difference? Can we use these terms, these constructs in a
meaningful way? If we cannot, then we cannot speak. To not
speak means a return to the silence from which we are only now
emerging. Not speaking is simply not an option. So we must speak.
But how can we speak of woman, of women, of gender, of
difference?
I do not believe that the postmodern rejection of the
absolute grounding of truth, and of essences discoverable by human
reason, necessarily implies the rejection of the possibility of
persuasion. This nihilistic tendency of postmodernism is both
112 Minow, "Partial Justice: Law and Minorities" in Austin Saret, ed., Amherst Lecture
Collection [forthcoming]: "All knowledge is partial and constructed through the perspective
of particular people, in particular social and historical situations."
113 Minow, "When Difference Has Its Home," supra, note 25 at 179: "Once one
participant in the debate says 'All claims of knowledge carry a perspective: none are based
in an unchanging reality' then anyone else who claims to know an unchanging reality at least
becomes vulnerable to the challenge: what is your perspective, that so entitles you or so
blinds you to make such a claim? Once there is more than one point of view, no point of
view can be treated as not a point of view."
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depoliticizing and unnecessary. 114 There are many ways that we can
engage in the activity of persuading others, short of basing such
persuasions on absolute truth. We have many stories of power, of
history, of experience to tell one another, and with one another. If
the postmodern project is understood as an attempt to recognize
the multiplicity of perspectives and stories, then it would seem to
be perfectly consistent with the project to bring forth women's
experiences and perspectives as one which has been silenced, and
excluded from the official story.115  While we must recognize that
on one level the varieties of women's experience make every woman
unique, we may still be able to articulate types of perspectives, based
on particular historical and psychological experience. We might
usefully be able to compare types of perspectives, or categories,
recognizing all the while the limitation of such categorization, and
the danger of ignoring difference within sameness, of universalizing
the experience of some women to the experience of all women.
And so, returning to the question of how do we speak of
woman, of gender, and of difference, I believe that the answer is
carefully and contingently. Carefully, in so far as we must be careful
to specify who is speaking and who is being spoken about. It is true
114 For a postmodern feminist rejection of this depoliticizing tendency towards nihilism,
see Nicholson, supra, note 108; Harding, supra, note 45; Minow, "Partial Justice," supra, note
112; C. Weedon, Feminist Practice and Post Structuralist Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1987); K. Ferguson, The Femizist Case Against Bureaucracy (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1984).
Rather than depoliticising, the feminist method, or rather, a method within feminism, can
be seen to be based upon recognising the fundamental importance of social change and the
importance of social criticism as a basis for such social change. It is, moreover, based on the
recognition of the need for social experience to inform and reinform the criticism. See
Schneider, "Rights and Politics," supra, note 98 emphasizing the fundamental interaction
between feminist theory and practice, as a form of consciousness raising. Schneider elaborates
at 603 that: "The idea of consciousness-raising as a method of analysis suggests an approach
to social change which recognizes dynamic tension, reflection, and sharing as essential aspects
of growth. Feminist theory values this process which starts with experience, generalizes
through self-reflection and evaluation, and then returns to experience. This dialectical process
transcends the oppositions of self and other, public and private, individual and community, and
is simultaneously grounded in an understanding that any connections between these apparent
dualisms will be only partial and tentative, and that distinctions will again emerge."
115 Schneider, "Rights and Politics," supra, note 98 at 603: "... [Fjeminist theory is
concerned with the articulation of women's voices and issues of silence. Power gives people
a voice and lack of power silences them. Women's voices and experiences have not been
heard because the subordination of women has denied them access to power."
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that we cannot all speak at once, and we cannot speak about
everything at one time. To avoid this cacophony, yet to allow us to
speak, we must be careful not to pretend to speak for those that we
do not speak for. And we must be careful to listen to one another
when we speak, to consult one another rather than hypothesize on
one another's views. Contingently, in so far as we must admit the
partiality of our perspectives, and the contingency of our knowledge
on these perspectives. We cannot pretend to discover truth, to tell
the one true story. While we can strive to embrace the perspective
of others, to expand the outer limits of our own perspectives, to
recognize a multiplicity of voices, we can never forget our partiality,
and thus, the contingency of our views.116 The postmodern message
to feminism, and particularly, to feminist legal theory, is to recognize
the partiality of our own views and realize we can never pin down
the ultimate truth, or find the one true story. We must remain, at
least contingently, committed to contingency.
B. Deconstructing the Dilemma
But what of the dilemma? Can these insights of the critique
of difference be used to resolve the dilemmas of difference?
Minow has suggested an approach in which these insights
can assist us in deconstructing the dilemma. She has directly
confronted the dilemma of difference, in seeking to translate the
insights of these general critiques of difference and self into a
concrete approach for overcoming the dilemma. Minow seeks to
unearth the deeper stories in difference. She argues that the
dilemma may be resolved by revealing the unstated assumptions
which underlie the assignment of difference, the power underlying
the construction of difference that have characterized the traditional
approaches to questions of difference.
Rather than accepting difference as an intrinsic characteristic
or property, she begins from an understanding of difference as
relational, as a measure of comparison.
116 Harding, supra, note 45 at 194: "By giving up the goal of telling 'one true story,' we
embrace instead the permanent partiality of feminist inquiry."
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"Difference' is only meaningful as a comparison. I am no more different from you
than you are from me. A short person is different only in relation to a tall one.
Legal treatment of difference tends to take for granted an assumed point of
comparison.
1 7
Through the social relations approach, Minow seeks to unearth the
connections between difference and power, that is, the relationships
of power that underlie the assignment of difference. Minow
identifies five unstated assumptions: (1) the assumption that
differences are intrinsic, not relational; (2) the assumption of an
unstated point of reference when describing someone as different;
(3) the assumption that the perspective of the person seeing or
judging is assumed to be objective; (4) the assumption that the
perspective of others, particularly the perspective of those being
judged is irrelevant; and, (5) the assumption that existing social and
economic arrangements are natural and neutral.
118
Minow argues that the dilemmas of difference can be
overcome by seeking out these powerful unstated assumptions, and
the relationships of power which underlie the assignment of
difference. She argues that:
The difference dilemmas, disrobed, are not insoluble problems about neutrality and
discretion, but are instead serious struggles over which versions of reality judges
should embrace. Taking minority perspectives seriously calls for a process of
dialogue in which the listener actually tries to reach beyond the assumption of one
reality, one version of truth! 1 9
She argues that we must have a "commitment to seek out and to
appreciate a perspective other than one's own."120 We must seek
out a multiplicity of perspectives and attempt to take the perspective
117 Minow, "Foreword," supra, note 25 at 13.
118 Minow, "Foreword," supra, note 25 at 34-54. Three propositions follow from this
assumption: " ... first, the goal of governmental neutrality demands the status quo because
existing societal arrangements are assumed to be neutral. Second, governmental actions that
change the status quo have a different status than omissions, or failures to act, that maintain
the status quo. Third, prevailing social and political arrangements are not forced on anyone.
Individuals are free to make choices and to assume responsibility for those choices."
119 Ibid. at 69-70.
120 Ibid. at 14.
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of the other 21 In seeking out these multiple perspectives, we must
remain sensitive to the narratives of power relationships which do
not disappear in the search for these perspectives 22
C. The Relational Self and the Social Relations Approach
The idea of the relational self was used to critique the
stories of self and other underlying the traditional model of contract
and the liberal model of the family upon which the decision in
Pelech was predicated. 123 Two possible implications of the critique
were suggested. On one level, the critique suggested that women
may be different than men in their approach to contract. The idea
of the relational self might be understood as a gender difference,
and seen to present a dilemma of difference. At another level, the
notion of the relational self was used to critique the liberal
voluntarist self, suggesting instead that all selves are relational.
These preliminary observations must now be reconsidered. In
light of the critique of feminist object-relations theory, of difference,
and of the more general challenge of postmodernism, we have to
ask whether we can talk about the relational self as a meaningful
concept. More specifically, can we talk about the relational self as
a difference, and at the same time talk about the relational self as
a more general description of the self? Moreover, we have to ask
how the notion of the relational self can help us overcome the
dilemmas of difference.
It is useful to begin by considering what we are talking about
when we talk about the relational self. Any number of meanings
121 Ibid. at 70-82.
122 Ibid. at 68. "Power is at its peak when it is least visible, when it shapes preferences,
arranges agendas, and excludes serious challenges from discussion or even imagination. Daily
social practices that reinforce existing arrangements stand in the way of efforts to expose
unstated assumptions about the power behind attributions of difference. It becomes hard, in
the face of such daily practices, to regard the glimpses of dominant conceptions as contestable
assumptions."
123 Supra, at 344-47.
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might be assigned to this notion. It might be a description of an
individual's self understanding, that is, the individual may have a
sense of herself as connected and related to others. It might be a
description of the description or label that others assign to particular
individuals. Along similar lines, it might describe the description that
we would assign to particular group of individuals, such as women.
It might also be a description assigned to all individuals based on a
theory of psychological development.
The notion of the relational self can be further
deconstructed, allowing us to more fully grasp its potential
contribution to our inquiries. The basic understanding of the self as
relational, as Minow writes "assumes that there is a basic
connectedness between people, instead of assuming that autonomy
is the prior and essential dimension of personhood".124 It is an
understanding of the self as implicated in and by others. It contains
the idea that we are situated in relation to others, and that our
relationships with others are partially constitutive of who we are.
125
Through this understanding of the relational self, we can
gain further insight into the notion of the autonomous self. The
sense of self as a separate and unconnected self can be understood
not in opposition to the relational self, but rather as a relational
self. The autonomous self is as much a product of its social
relationships as the sense of self as connected and dependent.
Feminist object-relations theory, for example, has attempted to
illustrate how the male sense of self as separate is forged in
relationship to others.126 Moreover, the very concept of autonomy
is only meaningful as a result of relationships of interdependence
124 Minow, "When Difference has its Home," supra, note 25 at 127.
125 Supra, at 342-43; S. Benhabib, "The Generalized and the Concrete Other The
Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Feminist Theory" in Feminism as Critique, supra, note 98
at 87 regarding the contrast between the "generalized other" and the "concrete other": "The
standpoint of the concrete other, by contrast, requires us to view each and every rational being
as an individual with a concrete history, identity and affective-emotional constitution. In
assuming this standpoint, we abstract from what constitutes our commonality. We seek to
comprehend the needs of the other, his or her motivations, what s/he searches for, and what
s/he desires."
12 6 Supra at 38-42.
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and power that allow some people to feel powerful in this way !27
The very idea of an autonomous self depends on the idea of a
dependent self, which makes both relational selves, but relational
selves which are asymmetrical in relation to power.
This understanding of the self as relational underlies what
Minow has identified as the social relations approach.'28 It is an
approach which attempts to translate the insights of the post-modern
challenge into a concrete approach to the study of social practices,
and particularly, legal practices. Minow describes the approach as
"emphasiz[ing] the social relations of groups and how these relation-
ships between people construct and express power and know-
ledge."
129
This social relations approach and the understanding of the
relational self on which it is based can provide valuable assistance in
both our general inquiries of differences and the dilemmas they
present, as well as to the particular question of the enforcement of
separation agreement. For example, by focusing our attention on
relationships, on particular relationships in particular contexts, this
approach can help us talk about the relational self as a difference
without reducing the notion to only a question of difference and
moreover, without constructing the difference as essential. The self-
understanding of some women as connected and dependent upon
others can be constructed as a difference, without essentializing the
difference, or losing sight of the broader implications of the
relational self. By focusing on particular relationships in particular
contexts, we can avoid overgeneralizing on the extent of the
127 J.W. Singer, 'The Reliance Interest in Property" (1988) 40 Stan. L Rev. 611
regarding the idea of mutual dependence and vulnerability.
128 Minow, "When Difference Has Its Home," supra, note 25; Singer, "The Reliance
Interest in Property," supra, note 127.
129 Minow, "When Difference Has Its Home," supra, note 25 at 128. Singer, supra, note
127 at 655 describing how the social relations approach directs our attention: "(1) It
encourages us to see people as situated in various relationships with others that continue
overtime. (2) It describes social relations as comprising a spectrum from short-lived relations
among strangers to continuing relations in the market to intimate relations in the family. (3)
It comprehends rights as emerging out of understandings that develop over the course of
relationships rather than as being fully articulated at clear decision points. (4) It encourages
us to ask various questions about relationships between the parties."
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difference. If we understand the self as socially constructed, we can
see how certain categories of women, with similar histories and life
experiences, may have similar self understandings.
By focusing our attention on the relationships between
people and the power contained and expressed in these
relationships, the idea of the relational self can help in our
understanding of the world as socially constructed and thus,
reconstructible, as opposed to given and immutable.
And by focusing on the relationships between people, the
relational self can be seen as integral to the strategy suggested for
deconstructing the dilemma of difference. The understanding of the
self as relational is crucial to this understanding of difference:
If one assumes that people are related to each other, then assertions of differences
are actually statements of relationships, since they express a comparison between
the one doing the asserting and the one about whom the assertion is made.
130
It is through the social relations approach that Minow seeks to
reveal the connections between power and difference.
VIII. WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES DIFFERENCE MAKE IN
PELECH?
With this social relations approach to difference and the
relational self in mind, we can return to a consideration of the
implications of the analysis for the enforcement of separation
agreements. What difference, if any, should either the relational self
or economic dependency make in the enforcement of separation
agreements? Can we talk about the relational self or economic
dependence as a meaningful difference? Can the differences survive
the postmodern challenge? How, if at all, does this challenge, this
new approach to difference, assist us in moving beyond the dilemma
of difference in Pelech?
130 Minow, "When Difference Has Its Home," supra, note 25 at 128.
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A. The Relational Self. What's the Difference?
As a gender difference, the idea of the relational self refers
to the understanding of the self as related and connected, either as
a description of self understanding, or as a description that we might
apply to particular individuals self understanding. It is in contrast to
an understanding of the self as autonomous, although both senses of
self are relational selves in the broader meaning of the term as a
self constituted by its social relationships.
As a gender difference, we must not overgeneralize the
applicability of the relational self. The postmodern challenge to this
understanding of the self as relational would reject the neatly
dichotomized constructions of self and question both the linear
causality between mothering and gender identity formation, and the
primary significance attached to gender. The idea of women's sense
of self as related and connected cannot therefore be thought to be
an intrinsic characteristic of women. Nor is this relational self a
universal characteristic of women. Rather, it is an expression of
relationship and a product of particular relationships. We must focus
on the particular relationships of particular women to determine
whether the understanding of self as connected and dependent
affected their approach to understanding their separation
agreements. While it is not a difference which will affect all women,
it is a difference which may affect some women with certain share
life experiences, and the objective ought to be to try to take these
differences into account in considering whether a separation
agreement ought to be enforced.
Feminist object-relations theory has been criticized, of
assuming white and middle class.131 It has focused on the question
131 See E. Spelman, The Inessential Woman: Problems of Fxclusion in Feminist Thought
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1988) regarding race and class as constitutive elements of gender.
Feminist object relations theory, in focusing on gender, has simply assumed race and class
as a constant, that is, as white and middle class; Fraser & Nicholson, Feminism and
Postmodemism, supra, note 108 at 22 regarding feminist object-relations theory emphasizing
similarities among women at expense of differences: "Although the theory allows for some
differences among women of different classes, races, sexual orientations and ethnic groups, it
construes these as subsidiary to more basic similarities." Harding, supra, note 45 regarding
exploring problems presented to both theories by the commonalities and differences of the
feminine relational self and world view, and the "African" relational self and world view.
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of gender, but not to the exclusion of race and class. Rather, there
is an underlying assumption of race and class, that is, of white and
middle class. We have no way of knowing to what extent, if at all,
this relational sense of self applies to non-white and non-middle
class women, and we can not simply generalize from the experience
of a limited class of women to the universal category of all women.
Furthermore, there is no basis for asserting that all women in the
category of white, middle class women have such senses of self.
There are undoubtedly many women within this category who have
developed a sense of self more accurately described as autonomous.
It is, moreover, a sense of self which may be closely
connected to economic dependency. The life history and experience
of women who are economically dependent may be a similar history
and experience giving rise to an understanding of the self as related
and connected, as dependent upon others.
The general issue which must be addressed is how this
understanding of the relational self as gender difference might help
us decide questions involving the enforcement of separation
agreements. First, it tells us how not to decide such cases. It tells
us that we cannot simply establish a gender-based principle, and
assume that all women have a related and connected sense of self
which must be taken into account in considering whether a
separation agreement ought to be enforced. Neither do all woman
have such senses of self, nor are all those women who may have
such senses of self necessarily motivated or affected by it in a
particular contractual setting. Rather, the insights of feminist object-
relations theory, as historicised, can be used to recognize that the
assumptions underlying the traditional justification for the
enforcement of contract do not hold for all women in all situations,
that in some circumstances, some women may be motivated by
considerations that the traditional model of contract law does not
take into account. We must seek out the historicised, contextualized
narratives of the individuals involved. We must examine the
particular relationships of individuals. Only then can we determine
the appropriateness of taking the individual's sense of self into
account.
The insights of the feminist object-relations theory can be
used as a means of expanding the limits of our perspectives, of
taking the perspective of the other, of recognizing that the
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perspective of those being judged may be relevant to the very matter
being judged. It may be useful to at least entertain the idea that
the individual in question may have been motivated by the
considerations identified by this theory, if the behaviour of the
individual does not seem to fit within the traditional model.
Moreover, it is only once the legitimacy of these
considerations are recognized that we can properly begin our
assessment of whether they were operative factors in particular
cases. Our inquiries are invariably affected by our understanding of
what we are trying to find. In the case of Mrs. Richardson, Mrs.
Pelech, and Mrs. Caron we have absolutely no way of knowing
whether any of these considerations were operating in the contract
because no one asked.
It may be that the inability to draw general principles from
the feminist critique of contract renders the resolution of these
matters more difficult, and more complex. However, it just may be
that the more complicated the resolution of these matters becomes,
the closer we are approaching a fair resolution, a resolution that is
capable of taking into account the complex totality of factors which
ought to be taken into account.
B. Economic Dependence: What's the Difference?
This analysis has identified economic dependence as
presenting a dilemma of difference - that is, that recognizing it and
ignoring it risks iecreating it. The analysis has assumed that it is a
meaningful difference. The question which must now be addressed
is whether it is in fact a meaningful gender difference, and if so,
how? We must re-conceptualize the nature of the difference we
are talking about when we talk about women's economic
dependence on men, in light of the alternative approach to
difference, to the relational self, and to overcoming the dilemmas of
difference.
First, we must recognize that we cannot talk about economic
dependence as a general difference which applies to all women.
Economic dependence is a condition which is both race and class
specific. Economic dependency, as traditionally constructed, is a
condition primarily of white, middle class women. Working class
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and minority women have a history of long-standing participation in
the market, and thus, the traditional pattern of economic
dependency has never described their experience. However, the
spectre of economic dependence looms large over even these
women1 3 2 The assumption of dependency is firmly embedded in a
myriad of our social relationships, and thus affects women whose
lives have never been structured according to this assumption.
133
The lives of working class and minority women fit neither the model
of dependency nor the model of economic self-sufficiency.
Furthermore, even within the limited category of white middle class
women, it is no longer a condition which describes all these women.
It is primarily white middle class women who have been able to
break out of dependency, and become economically self-sufficient in
the labour market. The difference of economic dependence is thus
a condition which specifically applies to a limited category of women,
but which nevertheless affects a much broader category of women.
Second, economic dependence is not a description of an
intrinsic characteristic of women, but rather, a description of a
relationship between some women and some men. It is a measure
of comparison in which the male norm is the unstated point of
reference. Women's economic dependence is only meaningful in
relation to men's economic self sufficiency. The relationship of
dependence means a relationship in which a woman is financially
dependent upon her husband. It implies a particular configuration
of family relationships, a particular relationship between women and
men. The norm is economic self-sufficiency, and women's economic
dependence is understood as a deviance from this norm. According
to this construction of difference, the male standard of economic self
sufficiency is thus implicitly accepted as the norm towards which
women must strive.
The difference of economic dependence is thus an extremely
complex difference. It is a difference which applies in varying
degrees to different women, and which is loaded with powerful
unstated assumptions about the way we organize the world. The
132 See hooks, From Margin to Centre, supra, note 107.
133 Supra, notes 54-6.
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question then becomes how we ought to approach this difference.
I believe that this question must be addressed on two levels. On the
level of principle, it is a question of both retrospective and
prospective justice, that is, of the principles according to which cases
like Pelech ought to be decided, and according to which individuals
will be encouraged to structure their lives. On a structural level, it
is a question of the connections between separation agreements and
broader societal structures which continue to create relations of
dependency. It is a question of who we believe should be
responsible for dependents in our society, particularly dependency
following marital breakdown. It is a question of how, if at all, self-
sufficiency can be realized for individuals who make certain choices.
1. Towards a principled approach to overcome dependence
The question which must be addressed at the end of the day
is how we believe cases like Pelech, Richardson, and Caron, ought
to be decided. Under what conditions should separation agreements
be enforced, and under what conditions should the Courts
intervene? What principled approach, if any, can the courts adopt
to resolve these cases, without recreating the problem it has set out
to deal with? Are there any general principles which can be
invoked to deal with the problem or in view of the complicated and
varied nature of the difference of dependence, should the courts
proceed with greater discretion, on a case by case basis?
(a) Formality vs. discretion
These remedial questions raise yet a third version of the
dilemma of difference identified by Minow:
The third version of the dilemma is the choice between broad discretion, which
permits individualized decisions, and formal rules that specify categorical decisions
for the dispensing of public - or private - power.' 34
134 Minow, "Foreword," supra, note 25 at 13.
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Minow describes the relationship of the question of discretion versus
formal principles to the question of difference:
The Court's commitment to the rule of law often leads it to specify, in formal
terms, the rules that govern the decisions of others. This practice can secure
adherence to the goals of equality and neutrality by assuring that differences are
not taken into account except in the manner explicitly specified by the
Court...[M]aking and enforcing specific rules engages the Court in the problem of
reinvesting differences with significance by noticing them...[T]he tension between
formal, predictable rules and individualized judgments under discretionary standards
thus assumes heightened significance in dilemmas of difference/
3 5
In the context of the dilemmas presented by difference, both formal
rules, like the sameness model, and the discretionary approach, like
the differences model, risk recreating and devaluing these
differences.
In Pelech, the Court established a formal principle to govern
the enforcement of separation agreements, a formal principle which,
but for the limited exception, ignores differences and threatens to
recreate the underlying difference of economic dependence.
However, the alternative of the judicial exercise of discretion on a
case by case basis, to take the full range of individual exigencies
and circumstances into account in the enforcement of separation
agreements, may reproduce the same difference. The very crux of
the dilemma of difference comes home to roost in this remedial
question.
In addressing the now familiar question of how this dilemma
can be overcome, we must recall the insights of the deconstruction
of difference. Difference is a relationship, and its dilemmas arise
"from powerful assumptions about whose point of view matters, and
what is given and what is mutable in the world."13 6  Neither an
approach based on formal principle nor an approach based on broad
discretion can solve the complexities posed by difference. Rather
than constructing the dilemma as an either/or, we must appreciate
that the solution to the dilemma lies somewhere in the balance
135 Aid. at 26.
136 Ibid. at 16.
1990]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
between these two contrasting approaches.' 37  It is not necessarily
general principles that we must reject to move towards a more
contextual justice, and towards a more contextualised mode of
decision making. Our effort to tell historicised, contextual narratives
is not inconsistent with principle, but it substantially qualifies our
expectations of the guidance that principle can give us. While we
need to retain principles to reflect our general commitments, and to
provide a degree of predictable and non-arbitrary decision making,
we need to recognize the limitations of any principle. We must not
expect that a single principle will be able to accommodate difference
in all its complexity, but rather, we may require a number of
competing principles, which will more adequately reflect the range
of individual exigencies and circumstance. Furthermore, we must
realize that principles cannot, in and of themselves, provide the
answers to the problem of difference. Rather, our decisions will
require normative choices, normative choices made in particular
social contexts.
As Minow writes:
I believe we should welcome complexity and challenge complacency - and stop
fearing that we will be unable to make judgments138
Instead of trying continually to fit people into categories, and to enforce or deny
rights on that basis, we can and do make decisions by immersing in particulars to
renew commitments to a fair world.
39
137 H.M. Hart & A.M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and
Application of Law (Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1958) at 163 regarding tension between
formality and discretion in law: "Exactly when and why the evenhandedness of law as opposed
to the individualization of treatment which comes from discretion is felt to be an ingredient
of justice, no single or simple formula can tell.' D. Kennedy, "Form and Substance in Private
Law Adjudication" (1976) 89 Harv. L Rev. 1685 for a discussion of tension between "clearly
defined, highly administrable, general rules" and "equitable standards producing ad hoc
decisions with relatively little precedential value"; N. Bala, "Judicial Discretion and Family Law
Reform" (1986) 5 Can. 3. of Family Law 15; M.A. Glendon, "Fixed Rules and Discretion in
Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law" (1986) 60 Tul. L Rev. 1165 regarding the
tension between formality and discretion in family law.
138 Minow, "Foreword," supra, note 25 at 90-91.
139 Ibid. at 91.
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Moving between specific contexts and general commitments, we can challenge
unstated assumptions that might otherwise rule...Thus, one reason we can still
decide, amid powerfully competing claims, is that immersion in particulars does not
require the relinquishment of general commitments. The struggle is not over the
validity of principles and generalizations - it is over which ones should prevail in
a given context.
1 4 0
Our decisions are not easy, and we ought not shy away from a recognition of their
complexity, nor from a recognition that we must make them
41
(b) Towards a principled approach to the enforcement of separation
agreements
The analysis of the nature of the difference of dependency
has revealed that we cannot simply assume that all women are in a
comparable situation of economic dependence. We cannot simply
draw a line on the basis of gender, and treat all women similarly on
marital breakdown. Economic dependency is a social relationship
that neither applies to all women, nor applies in the same degree to
the women to which it does apply. The approach we adopt to the
enforcement of separation agreements must recognize this complex
nature of the problem. No single principle will be capable of
accommodating these differences within difference and we, therefore,
must seek out the different principles required to take the
multiplicity of difference into account.
One possible approach to the dilemma presented by the
difference of dependency may be to break down the categories with
which we are dealing. Rather than classifying persons for
comparable treatment upon marital breakdown on either gender-
neutral or gender-based lines, it might be more useful to classify
140 Ibid. at 91-92.
141 J.W. Singer, "The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to
Hohfeld" (1982) Wise. L Rev. 975 at 1059. 'To make conscious choices, it is necessary to
realize that we are making a choice. To choose wisely, we must know who gains and who
loses from the concrete legal rules and what values are thereby preserved or undermined.
Once we know everything that is involved in the decision, and we have not arbitrarily
constricted the alternatives available to us, then we make a choice. Those decisions may be
difficult and they may be painful, but making choices is what human beings do:'
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persons according to the difference in question, that is, according
to economic dependency or non-economic dependency. Beginning
with this characteristic rather than gender as the basis for
determining how individuals are to be treated avoids the problem
of drawing over or under-inclusive generalizations on the basis of
gender.
1 42
We might begin by identifying at least two categories of
persons upon marital breakdown: economically dependent persons
and non-economically dependent persons. A third category of semi-
dependent persons might also be identified who may not exhibit the
full pattern of economic dependency, but who nevertheless fall
considerably short of economic self-sufficiency. Examples of persons
who might fall within this category are women who have worked
sporadically during marriage, who worked part-time during marriage,
or who worked full-time, but in low paying occupations, and thus
relied on their husbands' income.
Different rules governing marital breakdown in general, and
the enforcement of separation agreements in particular, could be
devised for these different categories.1 43 In marital relationships
between non-dependent spouses, there is no difference of economic
dependence and. thus no reason to be concerned with recognizing
the difference upon marital breakdown. Rather, the principles of
equality and independence may reflect the relative economic position
of the spouses, and are, thus, appropriately invoked to govern the
relationship between the parties upon marital breakdown.
Dependent and semi-dependent spouses could, on the other hand,
be treated in a manner that recognizes their distinctive economic
relationship within marriage.
142 There is no reason to limit the analysis to the economic dependency of women. The
analysis is equally applicable in general to dependent persons, for example, persons with
disabilities and male spouses who choose to raise the children.
143 See Minow, "Consider the Consequences," supra, note 44 at 909: "Some of
Weitzman's findings suggest that a two.tiered divorce system - with one set of rules for
couples conforming to traditional gender expectations and another set of rules for
hypothesized 1980s style dual-career, dual parenting couples - could take care of the worst
applications of current law." This two-tiered approach can also be seen to have been implicitly
suggested by Matas J.A.1 in his admonition that it would be unfair to attempt to treat his two
hypothetical examples of different kinds of marriage, exhibiting different patterns of financial
relationships, according to the same principle. See, supra, at 317-19.
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However, a rigid classification scheme of spouses on the basis
of economic dependency, semi-dependency and non-dependency
presents a number of problems. First, it will entail the drawing of
sharp lines between categories. What criteria can be devised to
categorize spouses, particularly, those spouses at the margins. For
example, where might a woman be classified who was married for
fifteen years, with three children, was employed in a clerical position
for the first three years of marriage and who has been economically
dependent on her husband since that time? Is twelve years of
economic dependency, and atrophied labour skills, sufficient to
classify the woman as totally dependent? Or, is she only semi-
dependent as a result of her employment history during the
marriage? We may furthermore want to ask how much ought to be
contingent upon the category in which the woman falls. How
different should the treatment be between the dependent spouse
and the semi-dependent spouse?
Furthermore, there is a more general question of whether
any individual can ever be described as non-dependent. Prager, for
example, argues that separate marital property regimes, based on
notions of independent financial relationships during marriage, fail
to reflect the interdependent reality of spouses financial affairs.144
Even seemingly economically self-sufficient spouses are often
intricately involved in each other's financial relationships. Moreover,
we need to ask what non-economic dependency means in light of an
understanding of the self as relational. Individuals are deeply
implicated in their relationships with others, including their economic
relationships. The very notion of economic self-sufficiency, while
meaningful on one level, seems to be predicated on a voluntarist
self, on a self that exists independently of and prior to its
144 Prager, "Shifting Perspectives on Marital Property Law" in B. Thorne & M. Yalom,
eds, Rethindng the Family: Some Feminist Questions (New York: Longman, 1982) at 117
discussing the needs and expectations created by marriage. ... [They] shape the frame of
mind with which decisions are made during marriage. The expectation of stability and
continuity and the desire for a shared life suggest that married people are unlikely to make
decisions on an individually oriented basis; rather, the needs of each person tend to be taken
into account. Thus, married people will often make different decisions from those they would
make if there were no marriage or marriage-like relationship functioning." See also P. Symes,
"Property, Power and Dependence: Critical Family Law" (1987) 14 J. of Law and Society 199
for a discussion of the "dilemma of dependence."
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relationships. The substitution of a relational understanding of the
self challenges the meaning of economic self-sufficiency, and leads
instead to an understanding of all individuals as being, in some
respect, dependent.
Rather than constructing non-dependence, semi-dependence
and dependence as three conceptually distinct categories, it might
be more in accord with a relational approach to conceptualize
economic dependency as a continuum. The particular treatment to
be given to particular individuals would depend where they were
located on this continuum. When understood as a continuum, we
would avoid the problems associated with a rigid classification
scheme. Rather than forcing fine distinctions, this approach would
examine the extent of the dependency and compensate the spouse
accordingly. It would begin from the assumptions that we are all in
some respects dependent, but that marriages can and do engender
differing degrees of dependency which will require differing degrees
of compensation.
An understanding of economic dependency as a continuum
would furthermore assist us in moving beyond the dilemma of
difference. If we recognize that we are all in some ways dependent,
we avoid the cqnstruction of the difference, as an either/or, as
something to be recognized or not. The question then becomes not
whether there is a difference to be recognized, but rather, whether
the degree of dependency is sufficient to warrant that it be taken
into account. This rather subtle distinction allows for the
construction of the difference of dependency in relative terms, and
the relevant inquiry becomes how the degree of dependency ought
to be taken into account. While in some respects, the issue still
comes down to whether or not in the enforcement of a separation
agreement economic dependency will be taken into account, the
construction and deconstruction of the concept of difference, as
Minow has argued, is crucial to the project of overcoming the
dilemma.!45
It might still be argued that in the cases where the
dependence is such that it is held to warrant recognition that the
same dilemma of recreating difference by recognizing it will be
145 Supra, note 25 and at 355-56.
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encountered. We must recall that the dilemma of difference is only
a problem as long as the recognition of the difference could be
harmful or stigmatizing.14 6 By not recognizing dependence when it
is not as significant a factor in the economic relationship of the
parties, the problem of recreating the stereotype of woman as
dependent, for women who are not economically dependent to the
same degree vanishes. However, we still have to consider the
implications for more dependent persons of the recognition of this
difference. Will such recognition of difference reinforce the existing
imbalances in the distribution of power? Will those women be hurt
by the recognition of this dependency?
14 7
It is reasonably clear that these economically dependent
women will be hurt and the existing distribution of power will be
reinforced, if these differences are ignored. We can again see how
the question then becomes not whether or not to recognize the
difference, but rather how best to recognize the difference without
recreating the problem. Another question that might arise is
whether this approach amounts to anything more than judicial
discretion. There is no doubt that there is discretion in this
approach. Yet, there is always discretion in judicial decision making,
even if often masked in the guise of principle. A recognition of
discretion need not lead to an abandonment of principle. Rather,
we can return to a reformulation of the test, or at least a broader
approach to the test, when dealing with those spouses who exhibit
a greater degree of dependency.
(I) The requirement of a change in circumstances ought to
be broadly construed. Once an underlying pattern of economic
dependence is evidenced, the change in circumstances with which
the court ought to be concerned is a change following the marital
breakdown. Furthermore, the court ought to be concerned with a
change in the fundamental assumptions regarding circumstances
underlying the separation agreement.
146 Minow, "When Difference Has its Home," supra, note 25 at 128: "Attributions of
difference should be sustained only if they do not express or confirm the distribution of power
in ways that harm the less powerful and benefit the more powerful."
147 Christine Littleton has argued that we must make difference cost-less. See C.
Littleton, "Reconstructing Sexual Equality' (forthcoming Cal. L. R.).
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(2) The objective test of foreseeability ought to incorporate
a more subjective element. The courts ought not to be concerned
with foreseeability from the perspective of the reasonable white,
middle class, male judge, who may have a more sophisticated grasp
of the harsh economic reality facing women upon marital breakdown,
and may be in a better position to evaluate the marketability of the
woman in the labour force. Rather, we ought to be concerned with
the question of foreseeability from the perspective of the person
being judged. As part of the historicised, contextualised narrative
that we must unravel in dealing with each of these cases, we must
examine the particular relationships, and determine, as best we can,
the particular individual's understandings of the implications of the
marital breakdown. Rather than treating the self conception and
worldview of the person being judged as unimportant to our
treatment of that person, we must seek out this perspective. We
must not judge this particular relationship according to some
objectively determined standards, but rather, strive to understand the
perspective of those within the relationship. By tailoring the remedy
more specifically to the categories of persons afflicted and/or not
afflicted by the difference, we might be better able to bring the
perspectives of these different categories of persons to bear.
(3) The requirement of a causal connection between the
change in circumstances and economic dependency ought to be
broadly construed so as to appreciate the multiplicity of causal
relationships in economic dependency. The courts ought not to be
searching for a uni-linear causal relationship, but rather, ought to
proceed from an understanding of the interdependence of factors
leading to dependency. An appreciation of the interconnection of
relationships that mutually constitute economic dependency might
be reflected in terms of legal standards in a number of ways.
Evidence of a pattern of economic dependence might as an extreme
example render the contract void or voidable. It might trigger a
rebuttable presumption that the contract is unfair. It might shift
the onus of proof to the party seeking to uphold the agreement to
satisfy the court that the contract has adequately taken the
relationship of dependency into account, and that the contract is
thus fair. It might simply trigger a higher level of scrutiny by the
courts in evaluating the fairness of the contract. There is a range
of options for taking the difference into account, for translating our
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concern with the difference of economic dependency into legal
criteria for determining the enforceability of the contract.
These suggestions for a broad reading of the test in Pelech
are just a beginning. It is only a suggestion of how the problem of
economic dependency might be more appropriately handled within
the existing law of separation agreements. Although perhaps
stretching the approach in Pelech beyond its limits, it remains an
attempt to deal with the dilemmas within the confines of the current
legal regime. An adjustment of the principles by which the courts
enforce or vary separation agreements will go only a very short
distance in alleviating the dilemmas of economic dependency in
women's lives. The development of a principled approach to the
dilemmas will require a more comprehensive doctrinal reform,
involving a rethinking of the more general principles of family law,
of principles of property and support, and more generally, of the
philosophy of formal equality and economic self sufficiency that
underlies the existing regime.
2. Towards an understanding of systemic dependence
The dilemmas that we face only appear insoluble if we fail
to expose the unstated assumptions upon which the dilemmas are
constructed. And so we must try to expose the unstated
assumptions that make the dilemma of economic dependency seem
insoluble.
It seems that there are at least two underlying assumptions
that may cloud our ability to see beyond the dilemma. The first is
that the family ought to be the primary source of financial support
for its members. Implicit in the issumption is the norm of the
traditional family,, The second is that the existing social order is
natural and immutable. The dilemma is located firmly within the
realm of doctrine, that is, within the principles of family law. Since
the social order is understood as natural, neutral and unchanging,
the dilemma is understood only as a doctrinal dilemma.
However, if we begin to see the connections between the
dilemma at the doctrinal level and the myriad of social relationships
which are predicated on and reinforce dependency, if we begin to
realize that these are not fixed and intransigent, but socially
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constructed and thus reconstructible, we can begin to see that the
dilemmas are not insoluble.
The traditional gender division of labour in the family has
indeed been instrumental in the creation and recreation of women's
economic dependence. Family law has been both predicated upon
and played an important role in recreating this traditional division
of labour in the family. However, the traditional model of the
family, and the law based therein, have not been the only factors in
the creation and recreation of this difference. A whole range of
social relationships and institutions have been both premised upon
and served to reinforce this dependency. From the wage differential
between women and men, to the assumption of dependence under
lying social welfare benefits, our society has been structured upon
this assumption 48
The cycle of dependency will therefore not be broken by an
exclusive focus on a restructuring of the family and the principles of
family law. We cannot' simply change the rules of the game at one
level. We cannot tell women that they must fend for themselves,
and maintain the rules of the game from the days when women
were told to depend on their families.149 As we move away from
the notion of the traditional family unit as the basic economic unit
in society, then we must re-evaluate all the institutions which have
been built upon this assumption that "individual economic needs are
fulfilled by the family unit, a family unit that includes a wage-earning
148 Supra, note 54 and at 328-29.
149 Land, supra, ,note 56 regarding women's claims to maintenance is not reducing
economic inequalities because of context of inadequate state support and women's inferior
access to jobs and wages. Women's claims to economic support from the family, the state,
and the market are all in the process of change, and a woman's claim on one system should
not be altered without regard to the strength of her claims on the other systems because all
three are closely interrelated; Smart, "Marriage, Divorce and Women's Economic Dependency:
A Discussion of the Politics of Private Maintenance," supra, note 29 at 23: "... [WMe should
be critical of legislative changes that only tinker with family law to the detriment of women
and that are not combined with more progressive changes to our system of state benefits,
changes that could provide women, with or without children, with some degree of financial
independence from men." Smart, The Ties that Bind- Law, Mariage, and the Reproduction of
Patriarchal Relations," supra, note 31 at xiii-xiv- "[Flamily law ... as one area of the law which
contributes to the complex processes which reproduce women as economic dependents within
marriage and the family."
374 [voL 28 No. 2
Domestic Contracts
man".15 ° Both the market and the state must recognize and adapt
to the changing demands on women, and the changing reality of
women's lives. These institutions must furthermore be sensitive to
the transitional stage in which women find themselves.
If we are seriously committed to overcoming this dependency,
then we must therefore be committed to a remedial approach which
is structural in nature, which recognizes the complex and intricate,
interconnected nature of the problem. It is all connected. There
are no self-contained remedies that can address the dilemma of
dependency, in all its complexity. Breaking the cycle of dependency
will require a fundamental rethinking and restructuring of the full
range of social relationships and institutions which have been
constructed on the premise of women's economic dependency.
In rethinking the relationship between the family, the market
and the state, we can perhaps begin by asking who we believe ought
to be responsible for dependant persons in our society. Where
should the financial burden for non-self sufficient persons lie? In
Pelech the Court was quite explicit that but for the limited
exception, the responsibility for non-self sufficient persons was on
the State. 51 The Court, while acknowledging the shifting of
responsibility for dependents from the family to the state, failed to
acknowledge the reinforcement of the difference through depen-
dence on the state.
15 2
Enlarging the possibilities for state assistance to dependent
persons, through for instance improved welfare benefits or a
guaranteed annual income for housewives might simply create a new
version of the dilemma. By recognizing the relationship of
dependence, the state might be recreating the difference. Would
such recognition of the difference continue to stigmatize those who
are attributed as different? Would this attribution of difference
simply reinforce the existing imbalance in the distribution of power
which have created the relationship of dependency?
150 Minow, "Consider the Consequences," supra, note 44 at 914.
151 Pelech, supra, note 2 at 270; Richardson, supra, note 3.
152 Pelecl; supra, note 2 at 270.
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Furthermore, we have to inquire into the role of the state in
the creation and recreation of women's economic dependency. If
the state has been directly implicated in this dependency, through
its regulation of the family, the market and the regime of social
welfare, can increased reliance on the state be seen as the answer
to women's dependency?
The question of who should be responsible for dependent
persons in turn raises more broad reaching questions regarding the
current model of economic self sufficiency. We must unearth the
unstated assumptions of this model, the assumptions about sameness
and difference, about norms and deviance which inform our
understanding of this model. The notion of dependency implicates
a particular model of self sufficiency, a model from which the
dependent person deviates. We have to ask whether we accept
economic self sufficiency as a normatively desirable objective. More
specifically do we accept the male model of economic self sufficiency
as a normatively desirable objective?
The prevailing model of individual economic self-sufficiency
involves entering the labour force. The decision in Pelech, and
indeed the general approach to family law underlying the current
legal regime, endorses this model of economic self-sufficiency, and
thus forces particular choices on women. The assumption of
individual economic self sufficiency and the distribution of the family
resources upon marital breakdown on the basis of this assumption,
sets up an incentive for women to enter the labour market, and
attain this self sufficiency. This model rejects domestic labour and
child-rearing as a legitimate choice for women. Women who make
these choices risk dependency, and ultimately poverty.
The incentives structured into the legal regime reinforce the
devaluation of women's domestic labour, that is, of failing to
recognize the labour performed in the home as productive labour.
If we are not willing to say that domestic labour and child-rearing
are not legitimate choices for individuals in our society, then we
must determine how we can secure the legitimacy of these choices.
This in turn involves a question of how financial security can be
best secured for those individuals who choose this alternative. Are
there alternatives to continued reliance on the ex-spouse, or reliance
on the State? One suggestion is marriage insurance. Parties could
insure against the risk of marital breakdown, or more particularly, of
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loss of income as a result of a marital breakdown.. At the beginning
of the marital relationship, the parties could take out a no-fault
policy. The capital accumulated by the insurance premiums would
go into a pool, available for others with a similar risk. 53 Such a
scheme of marital insurance has a number of potential advantages.
It might reduce the financial burden on both the economically self-
sufficient spouse and the State, as well as provide women with a
degree of economic security which is not at all guaranteed by a
continued reliance on their ex-spouses or by a shifting reliance to
public welfare assistance. Furthermore, it might serve to both
increase and legitimate women's choices. Unlike the decision in
Pelech and its model of economic self sufficiency, which forces
women to bear the risk of future impoverishment, of choosing to
work in the home, and thus, reinforces the devaluation of women's
domestic labour, a scheme of marital insurance might allow women
to make these choices without the risk of long term dependency. It
might provide a means of facilitating real choice for women and
legitimating the choices that women make. Moreover, insurance can
be seen as relational, as based on the relational self. It involves the
pooling of risks and resources, and in so doing, involves seeking one
another as mutually implicated and interdependent. It connects the
self with others, and the present with the future.
The attempt to increase the choices for women, and to
legitimate their choices must not be to the neglect of those women
who are attempting to enter the labour market. A whole range of
social programmes, from comparable worth programmes to child
care facilities, are required to facilitate the entry of women into the
labour market, by eliminating the structural barriers women face
entering the market, and forcing the labour market to accommodate
women's needs, rather than women changing to accommodate the
needs of the market.
153 The details of such a policy remain to be worked out. It would, of course, have to
be no-fault and ought to be non-profit. It could be modelled on existing state insurance
schemes, such as unemployment insurance or workers' compensation schemes. Caution would
have to be had in the development of actuarial tables to determine risk and premiums, as the
possibilities for structuring in discriminatory assumptions and recreating the dependency may
be limitless.
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It is well beyond the scope of this paper to comprehensively
map out the full range of remedial action required to transcend the
dilemma of dependency. Sweeping legislative change is required to
restructure the market and the state to allow women to break out
of the dependency cycle. My objective has simply been to illustrate
the fundamental interconnections between reform in the family, the
market and the state, and consequently that focusing exclusively on
reform within the family will not solve the dilemma, but may in fact
exacerbate the harsh economic reality women experience upon
marital breakdown. Economic dependence will not be overcome
without structural reform, reform which will require a fundamental
rethinking of the nature of the relationship between family, market
and the state. 54 While there is certainly an institutional limit to
the ability of the courts to address the various forms of structural
change required to overcome the dilemma of economic dependency,
we might at least expect the courts to function within the realm of
their institutional capacity and evaluate the different remedial
options available with an awareness of the broader structural context
of the problems with which they are dealing. The Court in Pelech
fell far short of such an awareness.
IX CONCLUSION
"I1 ne faut pas avoir peur d'avoir peur."
Helene Cixious
I have tried to unravel the stories told in family law, and
particularly in the law regarding the enforcement of separation
agreements, of the relationship between self and other, between
the individual, family and society. These are not the stories of
deeply constituted selves, but selves abstracted from their social
contexts and experience. These are not stories of difference but of
sameness. These stories fail to appreciate differences across
154 Mossman, "Family Law and Social Welfare," supra, note 29 about assumptions
underlying the social welfare system being increasingly at odds with the assumptions underlying
family law, that is, whereas family law increasingly presumes an obligation on women for self
sufficiency, the social welfare system presumes economic dependence. See also Eichler, supra,
note 77, and Mossman & McLean, 'Toward a New Equality," supra, note 29.
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commonalities - complex and multiple differences which make us all
very different individuals despite our commonalities. The stories are
not the richly contextual stories that we must tell to deal with the
dilemmas that we face. The stories are in effect too simple, and
ultimately fail to deliver their promise of happy endings.
I have tried to denaturalize these stories, and to show that
it is only if we accept these stories as natural and unchanging that
we encounter the dilemmas as unsurmountable. If we approach our
dilemmas with a willingness to imagine alternative social relationships
and institutions, the dilemmas no longer appear insoluble -
challenging perhaps, but not insoluble.
We must begin with stories of difference, and thus with many
different stories. We must use our imagination to tell innovative
and contextual stories about ourselves and our relationships. Our
relationships are all mutually constituting. There are no simple lines
of causality which can be drawn. In a complex, interdependent
society, in a society in which male domination is complex and
multidimensional, in which the multiplicity of relationships of male,
and all other forms of domination are mutually constituting and
reinforcing, we can never expect to identify a single problem, a
single issue, a single cause, which can overcome this domination.
While we must of course begin by identifying these factors, we must
simultaneously recognize their multiplicity and interrelatedness.
And while it is true that we cannot address everything at
once, we must be aware of the fundamental limitations of addressing
problems one at a time. In order to act, we must try to have as
complete a picture as possible of where we are, how we got here,
where we think we might like to go, and how we might get there,
recognizing all the while the partiality of our picture. The partiality
of our knowledge is such that with every step, we must reevaluate
everything we thought we knew.
The conclusions that flow from my discussion are thus not
hard and fast, but fluid and perhaps unsettling, particularly for those
used to having everything settled at the end. My conclusions seem
to be that our dilemmas are complex, our knowledge is partial, and
everything is connected. And, from these open-ended and unsettling
remarks flow other, perhaps equally open ended and unsettling,
remarks. If our dilemmas are complex, then so too must be our
solutions. If our knowledge is partial, then we must continue to
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seek out a multiplicity of perspectives. If everything is connected,
then we must continue to search for the connections.
We must not forget that we are talking about relationships,
about relationships between people whose lives matter, and whose
lives may be a matter of difference.
